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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is the second appeal concerning multiple award contracts issued by the Idaho 
Department of Administration ("DOA") to Qwest Communications Company, LLC ("Qwest") 
and ENA Services, LLC ("ENA") for construction, operation and maintenance of the Idaho 
Education Network ("IEN''). This Court held, in Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Department of 
Administration, 305 P.3d 499, 502 (Idaho 2013) ("Syringa !'), that Syringa Networks, LLC 
("Syringa") was injured by DOA's actions in issuing amendments ("Amendments No. 1") that 
split otherwise identical and lawful multiple award contracts into separate contracts for dissimilar 
services in violation of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718(2) and 67-5718A. The District Court held, 
following remand, that the IEN contracts, as amended by Amendments No. 1, ("IEN Contracts, 
as Amended") do not conform to the IEN Request for Proposals ("RFP") description of the 
property to be acquired, violate Idaho Code§§ 67-5718(2) and 67-5718A, and are void. DOA, 
Qwest and ENA have appealed that determination. 
Neither DOA, Qwest, nor ENA make any effort to demonstrate that Amendments No. 1 
were lawful. DOA and Qwest contend, instead, that the District Court misinterpreted Syringa I 
and went too far by holding that the IEN contracts, as amended are void. According to DOA and 
Qwest, Syringa I required only that Amendments No. 1 be stricken. ENA separately contends 
that it was erroneously brought back into the litigation after remand and that the District Court 
was powerless to invalidate any part of its IEN contract. None of the Appellants' positions can 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 1 
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be reconciled with the fundamental principal of Syringa I that the unlawful nature of DOA's 
actions fatally tainted the IEN competitive bidding process. 
This Court held in Syringa I that Syringa was injured by, and has standing to redress, the 
violation of the violations of Idaho Code§§ 67-5718(2) and 67-5718A that destroyed its ability 
to fairly compete in the IEN competitive bidding process. 
Syringa has alleged a distinct and palpable injury, not suffered by 
all Idaho citizens, that is alleged to have been caused by the 
challenged conduct and that can be redressed by judicial relief. The 
record indicates that had the RFP solicited bids for separate 
contracts that described the property to be acquired in accordance 
with the amended contracts ultimately awarded, Syringa would 
have bid to perform the work specified in the amended contract 
awarded to Qwest. Syringa submitted a bid to ENA to perform that 
same work. Therefore, Syringa has standing to challenge the 
amended contract to Qwest because it constituted, in effect, 
changing the RFP after the bids were opened. 
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. 
DOA, Qwest, and ENA advance carefully compartmented arguments in an attempt to 
avoid the judicial redress available under Syringa I. But these arguments are to no avail because 
the District Court's determination that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, violate Idaho Code §§ 
67-5718(2) and 67-5718A and are void is the only redress available to Syringa under the law. As 
a result of the District Court's judgment, Syringa and other potential providers of services 
required by the IEN have had the opportunity to fairly compete in new IEN and state agency 
broadband procurements that comply with the law. See, e.g., Senate Bill No. 1175 passed as part 
of the 2015 Session Laws, Chapter 346. No other result could provide this redress for the injury 
sustained by S yringa and identified by this Court. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
1. The IEN RFP, the Awards, the Contracts and Amendments No. 1 
The IEN was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance 
learning for public schools, libraries and state agencies. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 502. The DOA 
was given administrative oversight of the IEN, including "[p]rocur[ing] telecommunications 
services and equipment for the IEN through an open and competitive bidding process." Id. 
(brackets in original). That process involved, among other things, the publication of the IEN 
RFP that described the services sought and the requirements for bidding. Id. 
In spite of its name, the IEN RFP was not solely about education. Part of the IEN project 
was to provide services to schools and libraries and was designed to qualify for federal E-Rate 
funding. The other part of the system was to serve state agencies, was intended to replace "aging 
Idanet equipment and services," and was not designed to be subsidized by E-rate funding. (R. p. 
1788.) Detail concerning the state agencies involved in the IEN project was added to the IEN 
RFP by Amendment 03 on December 29, 2008. These agencies and locations were identified in 
the seven pages of Appendix F added to the IEN RFP by Amendment 03. (Exhibits to 
Augmented R., Ex. D to the March 19, 2010 Affidavit of Mark Little ("Little Affidavit"). 1) 
Notwithstanding the extensive scope of the project, the IEN RFP sought "proposals from 
bidders who were able to perform the entire contract which, under the wording of the RFP, 
1 The Augmented Record cited herein refers to the record of the prior appeal in this case (No. 38735). This 
Court entered an Order Augmenting Appeals on June 2, 2015, which ordered that the appeal record in this 
consolidated appeal be augmented to include the Court File, Clerk's Record, and Reporter's Transcripts filed in the 
prior appeal. 
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would be a 'total end-to-end service support solution."' Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 505 (emphasis 
added). Toward that end, the RFP encouraged partnerships and directed vendors not to bid on a 
"particular section of the RFP": 
As stated in the RFP, the State desires to partner with a total 
service solution provider. Vendors interested in bidding on a 
particular section of the RFP, are highly encouraged to work with a 
major service provider partner or partners, in an effort to meet all 
of the required specifications as set forth in this document. 
(Exhibits to Augmented R., Ex. E to Little Affidavit, RFP "A-15" (emphasis in original)); see 
also Syringa L 305 P.3d at 503-05. 
Because it was prohibited from submitting a bid solely on broadband services, Syringa 
entered into a Teaming Agreement with ENA under which it provided pricing and technical 
information that was used in ENA' s response to the IEN RFP. If the RFP had allowed vendors 
to bid on specific sections, Syringa could have bid on the broadband section of the RFP and 
would not have needed to team with ENA. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. 
Upon receiving the evaluation scores that showed Qwest in second place behind ENA, 
DOA announced it would make a multiple award under Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. Id., 305 P.3d 
at 503. Shortly thereafter, on January 28, 2009, DOA issued identical Statewide Blanket 
Purchase Orders ("SBPOs") for same or similar services to Qwest and to ENA. SBPO 1308 was 
issued to Qwest and SBPO 1309 was issued to ENA. These multiple award contracts allowed 
competition between Qwest and ENA to provide all the services described in the RFP as required 
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by Idaho Code§ 67-5718A.2 Id. 
Amendments No. 1 were issued 29 days later on February 26, 2009. These amendments 
were documented by Change Order-01 and titled "Amendment One (1)" to the Qwest and ENA 
SBPOs. (Exhibits to Augmented R., Exs. K and L to Little Affidavit); see also Syringa I, 305 
P.3d at 503. State Purchasing Manager Mark Little testified that Amendments No. 1 "further 
defined" the "scope of work" for Qwest SBPO 1308 and for ENA SBPO 1309. (R. pp. 728-
729.) 
The further definition of the scope of work contained in Amendments No. 1 split the IEN 
project into two contracts for dissimilar property and services and eliminated the competition 
between Qwest and ENA that was created by the original IEN contracts. Amendment No. 1 to 
Qwest SBPO 1308 assigned "technical network services" and all "internet services" exclusively 
to Qwest: 
1. Qwest will be the general contractor for all IEN technical 
network services. The service provider listed on the State's 
Federal E-Rate form 471, Education Networks of America 
(ENA) is required to work with the dedicated Qwest 
Account Team for ordering, and provisioning of, on-going 
maintenance, operations and billing for all lEN sites. 
* * * 
4. Qwest, in coordination with ENA, will provide all Internet 
services to IEN users. 
2 DOA acknowledges this fact in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or 
Clarification on which it states, "SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309 are identical awards authorizing the state to select any 
service covered by the Idaho Education Network ('IEN') Request for Proposals ('RFP'), which also includes the 
wide area network used by the state agencies, from either Qwest or ENA." (R. p. 1660.) 
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(Exhibits to Augmented R., Ex. K to Little Affidavit (emphasis added).) 
Amendment No. 1 to ENA SBPO 1309 designated ENA as the federal E-Rate provider, 
was consistent with the assignment of all IEN technical network services and internet services to 
Qwest, and assigned separate tasks to ENA that were not assigned to Qwest. (Exhibits to 
Augmented R., Ex. L to Little Affidavit.) 
Amendments No. 1 prohibited ENA from obtaining broadband services from any 
provider other than Qwest without the consent of Qwest. (R. p. 1524 (Deposition of Greg 
Zichau, p. 290, 1. 12 - 291, 1. 21).) The designation of Qwest as the general contractor for all 
IEN technical network services also made Qwest the exclusive provider of broadband services to 
state agencies. (R. pp. 1788, 1793-1794.) 
Finally, both Amendments No. 1 acknowledged the elimination of multiple award 
competition by identifying Qwest and ENA as "equal partners" in identically worded paragraphs 
8 to each Amendment No. 1. (Exhibits to Augmented R., Exs. K and L to Little Affidavit.) 
Confronted with the post-award amendment, and the resulting loss of competition, this 
Court concluded that DOA apparently "believed that the statute [Idaho Code § 67-5718A(l)] 
only controlled the initial award to multiple bidders" and that Amendments No. 1 would not be 
subject to the requirements of the statute. This Court then explained: 
A government agency may not do indirectly what it is prevented 
by law from doing directly. See O 'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 
Idaho 313, 325, 303 P.2d 672, 678 (1956) ("What cannot be done 
directly by the City of Idaho Falls because of constitutional 
limitations cannot be accomplished indirectly."). If the State could 
circumvent the statute simply by amending the contracts awarded 
to multiple bidders, then the statute would be of no effect. That 
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two-step approach is obviously not permissible when considered 
in light of subsection (3) of the statute, which states, "\Vhere a 
contract for property has been awarded to two (2) or more bidders 
in accordance with this section, a state agency shall make 
purchases from the contractor whose terms and conditions 
regarding price, availability, support services and delivery are most 
adva11tageous to the agency." I.C. § 67-5718A(3). Subsection (3) 
obviously intends, for the benefit of the taxpayers, that the 
multiple bidders who are awarded contracts will remain as 
competitors, which will only occur if they are furnishing the same 
or similar property. 
Syringa I, 305 P .3d at 505 ( emphasis added). 
Qwest and ENA protest that they never signed Amendments No. 1. While true, 
Amendments No. 1 were nonetheless accepted by Qwest and ENA, who performed and were 
paid millions of dollars in accordance with their terms for more than five years. Qwest and ENA 
also adopted and ratified Amendments No. 1 in subsequent amendments to the IEN SBPOs. 
2. Qwest and ENA Incorporate and Ratify Amendments No. 1 Via Subsequent 
Amendments to the JEN Contracts 
Qwest SBPO 1308 and ENA SBPO 1309 were each amended several times after the 
February 26, 2009 Amendments No. 1. The Qwest SBPO was amended multiple times and 
extended by amendment in 2013 to 2019. (R. pp. 557-724.) The ENA SBPO was also extended 
by amendment in 2013 to 2019. (R. pp. 725-854.) Each of these subsequent amendments was 
signed by the parties. Notably, the subsequent amendments also referred to and ratified 
Amendments No. 1 that were not signed by Qwest and ENA. 
Amendment No. 12 to Qwest SBPO 1308 recited, incorporated and ratified the unsigned 
Amendment No. 1 on March 25, 2013, as follows: 
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RECITALS 
A. The Department of Administration Division of Purchasing 
("Purchasing") issued a request for proposals for services related to 
the development of an educational network for the State of Idaho 
as RFP 02160. 
B. Purchasing awarded to CenturyLink a contract under the 
above request for proposals, which resulted in Agreement 
SBP01308. SBPO 1308 was amended pursuant to SBP01308-0l, 
SBP01308-02, SBP01308-03, SBP01308-04, SBP01308-05, 
SBP01308-06, SBP01308-07, SBP01308-08, SBP01308-09, 
SBP01308-I0, and SBP01308-1 l. 
C. The parties desire to further amend SBPO 1308 as set forth 
in this Amendment Twelve. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, which 
are incorporated herein by this reference, and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows ... 
(R. p. 565 ( emphasis added).) 
Amendment Two (2) to ENA SBPO 1309 was executed on January 18, 2013, extended 
the term ofENA's contract to 2019 and recited and incorporated Amendment No. 1 as follows: 
RECITALS 
A. Purchasing issued a request for proposals for services 
related to the development of an educational network for the State 
of Idaho as RFP 02160 (the "RFP") on behalf of the office of the 
Chief Information Officer ("OCIO"). 
B. ENA submitted a proposal in response to the RFP. 
C. Following an evaluation of the proposals, Purchasing 
selected ENA to perform certain services set forth in the RFP, 
which resulted in a contract memorialized in State Blanket 
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Purchase order number 1309 (SBP01309). SBP001309 was 
amended pursuant to State Blanket Purchase Order number 1309-
01 (SBP01309-01) and the attachment to SBP01309-01 captioned 
"Idaho Division of Purchasing Amendment One (1) to State of 
Idaho Education Network (IEN)" SBP01309-01 and its attachment 
are herein referred to as the "First Amendment". 
* * * 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, which 
are incorporated herein by this reference, and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which 1s 
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: 
(R. p. 728 ( emphasis added).) 
These amendments were followed in 2014 by further amendments designed to avoid the 
impact of Syringa I. 
3. Performance Under the IEN Contracts, as Amended. 
Performance under the IEN Contracts, as Amended, involved the provision of technical 
network services and internet services to Idaho schools and state agencies. Qwest either 
provided, or was the gatekeeper for all these services. Providers other than Qwest could be used 
only if Qwest consented. (R. p. 1522-1524 (Deposition of Greg Zichau, p. 280, 1. 24 - p. 286, 1. 
6; p. 290, 1. 12 -p. 291, 1. 21).) 
Even though ENA was the service provider listed on the State's federal E-Rate form 471, 
ENA could not directly contract with Syringa or any provider other than Qwest for IEN 
telecommunication services. This limitation became an economic problem for Idaho schools 
because ENA could not provide reasonably priced IEN services to school districts outside areas 
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that were routinely served by Qwest. As a result, several school districts in areas of the state that 
were poorly served by Qwest did not initially receive IEN services. The DOA identified 
33 locations by January, 2010 whose cost of service, if commenced, would exceed 150% of the 
established IEN reasonable cost per Mbps. DO,A~ personnel called these locations "Intervention 
Schools" and placed their IEN connections on indefinite hold. (R. pp. 1337-1238 (Third Aff. of 
Brady Kraft at ,r,r 8-11).) 
Although several different solutions to the problem of the Intervention Schools were 
considered, the most economical solution required Syringa to participate. Requests that Syringa 
agree to provide IEN connectivity to the IEN high cost areas were made by Qwest and ENA at 
the direction of Brady Kraft. (R. pp. 861-854 (Aff. of Brady Kraft at ,r,r 18-27); R. pp. 1129-1130 
(Aff. of Greg Zichau at ,r,r 67-70).) 
The problem of the Intervention Schools was resolved in mid-2011 when Syringa agreed, 
at the request of Jim Schmidt, President of Qwest, to enter into a limited Service Agreement to 
provide service to Qwest. (R. pp. 1130-1131 (Aff. of Greg Zickau at ff 69-74); R. pp. 1323-1355 
(Service Agreement).) The Intervention Schools were then brought online with the IEN. 
DOA contends that "Syringa hedged its bets" by entering into the Service Agreement 
with Qwest that allowed IEN service to be delivered economically to the Intervention Schools. 
(DOA Opening Brief at 5.) While it is true that Syringa was paid for providing service to allow 
Qwest to complete IEN connectivity, it is not true that Syringa was "hedging its bets." The 
economical service provided to the Intervention Schools as a result of Syringa's participation 
could have been provided sooner and without any Qwest general contractor mark-up under the 
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original IEN contracts. The original IEN contracts would have allowed ENA to select any 
technical network services provider and to compete with Qwest to provide services to the 
Intervention Schools under Idaho Code § 67-5718A. ENA was, however, prohibited by 
A1nendments No. 1 from competing with Qwest and from using any technicai network services 
provider other than Qwest without the consent of Qwest. Amendments No. 1, in other words, 
created the problem of the Intervention Schools. 
4. Existing State Agency Broadband Contracts Are Overridden and Replaced 
by the IEN Contracts, as Amended. 
DOA Director J. Michael Gwartney announced in June, 2009 that state agencies 
contracting with service providers other than Qwest would be "migrated" to Qwest. The result 
of this move was that existing state agency contracts with providers other than Qwest were 
repudiated by DOA. (R. p. 1788; R. pp. 1793-1794 (Deposition of Greg Zickau, p. 367, I. 6 - p. 
368, 1. 17).) 
Qwest provided services to state agencies pursuant to the IEN Contracts, as Amended 
commencing in 2009. By 2014, Qwest was billing approximately $160,000 per month "for 
services ordered against SBP01308 and provided to state agencies." (R. p. 1197 (Aff. of Joel 
Strickler at ,r 6).) Qwest billed additional amounts separately to ENA under the IEN Contracts, 
as Amended, for services provided to the IEN through ENA. (R. pp. 1197 (Aff. of Joel Strickler 
at ,r 5).) 
5. DOA, Qwest, and ENA Try to Rescind Amendments No. 1 to Moot this Case 
After Syringa I. 
This Court issued its opinion in Syringa I on March 29, 2013. In that opinion, it 
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concluded that changes to the respective IEN scopes of work for Qwest and ENA effected by 
Amendments No. 1 violated the law: 
An RFP is required to "describe the property to be acquired in 
sufficient detail to apprise a bidder of the exact nature or 
functionality of the property required." I.C. § 67-5718(2). A 
"request for proposals may be changed by the buyer through 
issuance of an addendum, provided the change is issued in writing 
prior to the bid opening date and is made available to all vendors 
receiving the original solicitation." IDAPA 38.05.01.052. By 
amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer 
furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect, 
changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation of 
I.C. § 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052. The separate 
contracts as amended no longer conform to the RFP's description 
of the property to be acquired. The description of property to be 
provided by Qwest under its amended contract is not a minor 
deviation from the property to be provided by the successful bidder 
under the RFP, nor is the property to be provided by ENA under its 
amended contract. "[M]ere schemes to evade law, once their true 
character is established, are impotent for the purpose intended. 
Courts sweep them aside as so much rubbish." O'Bryant, 78 Idaho 
at 325, 303 P.2d at 678. 
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the decision of this Court, DOA, Qwest, and ENA continued to operate 
under the IEN Contracts, as Amended, without any change that appears in the record until July, 
2014. At that time, apparently in preparation to filing a motion for summary judgment against 
Syringa's challenge to the IEN contracts, DOA entered into new amendments (the "Rescission 
Amendments") to the IEN SBPOs with Qwest and ENA. (R. pp. 1457-1461.) 
The Rescission Amendments purported to rescind Amendments No. 1 and to repudiate 
the incorporation and ratification of Amendments No. 1 that occurred in subsequent 
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amendments. The Rescission Amendment to Qwest SBPO 1308 contained no language of 
explanation. (R. pp. 1460-1461.) The Rescission Amendment to ENA SBPO 1309, on the other 
hand, contained the following explanation as a Recital: 
Neither the State nor ENA intended Amendment No. 1 to alter the 
services available from ENA under SBPO 1309. Non-parties to 
SBPO 1309 have misconstrued Amendment No. 1 to mean it 
altered the services ENA was eligible to provide under SBPO 
1309. To avoid any confusion or misperception about Amendment 
No. 1, the State and ENA are hereby confirming their 
understanding that Amendment No. 1 did not alter the services 
ENA was eligible to provide under SBPO 1309. Moreover, 
because Amendment No. 1 did not alter the rights and obligations 
of the parties to SBPO 1309, the State and ENA are hereby 
rescinding Amendment No. 1 to clarify that it had no effect on 
SBPO 1309. 
(R. p. 1457.) Although the wording of the Rescission Amendments is not identical, the meaning 
of the words used is clear and consistent. Paragraph 2 of the Qwest Rescission Amendment 
states: 
The Parties agree that Amendment No. 1, together with any 
language included in any amendments to SBPO 1308 incorporating 
by reference said Amendment No. 1, is and are hereby rescinded 
by the State, superseded and of no force or effect upon SBPO 
1308. 
(R. p. 1460.) Paragraph 2 of the ENA Rescission Amendment states the same thing in a slightly 
different way: 
(R. p. 1458.) 
Amendment No. 1, together with any language included in the 
subsequent amendments to SBPO 1309 incorporating by reference 
said Amendment No. 1, is and are hereby rescinded ab initio, 
superseded and of no force or effect upon SBPO 1308. 
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The record reflects no change in the conduct or performance of DOA, Qwest, or ENA as 
a result of the execution of the Rescission Amendments. The record also reflects no attempt by 
DOA, Qwest, or ENA to acknowledge the unlawful nature of the Amendments No. 1, or to repay 
the tens of millions of dollars paid while Amendments No. 1 were in effect. 
C. Course of Proceedings Below 
Syringa I was released by this Court on March 29, 2013. Syringa and DOA each filed 
Petitions for Rehearing. DOA's petition for rehearing raised two issues relevant to this appeal. 
First, DOA asked the Court to revisit and reverse its holding that Syringa had standing to assert 
Count Three of its Complaint. Second, DOA asked that the Court issue a substitute opinion 
concerning Syringa's standing that did not address the substantive issue of whether Idaho Code 
§ 67-5718A was violated. In its Petition, DOA contended that the question whether 
Amendments No. 1 violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A was not before the Court on appeal. (See 
Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Petition for Rehearing, filed May 3, 2013.) 
DOA's petition for rehearing was denied. (See Idaho Supreme Court Order dated July 11, 2013, 
p. 1.) 
After remand, Syringa filed a Rule 60(b)(6) and 15(a) Motion to Amend Complaint 
concerning its claims against J. Michael "Mike" Gwartney and Jack G. "Greg" Zickau, and a 
Motion to Rename Count Three and to Amend Paragraph 94 of its complaint after remand. The 
District Court issued a decision denying Syringa's 60(b)(6) motion and granting its Motion to 
Rename Count Three and to Amend Paragraph 94 on February 25, 2014. (R. pp. 50-60.) The 
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amended Count Three and amended Paragraph 94 of Syringa's Complaint added a challenge to 
the ENA SBPO, as amended, and alleged that the original IEN SBPOs were a pretext and the 
first step in the unlawful two-step approach undertaken by DOA. (R. pp. 61-81.) 
Syringa filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 20, 2014 asking the 
District Court to declare that SBPOs 1308 and 1309 violate provisions of Title 67, Chapter 57 of 
the Idaho Code and are void by operation ofidaho Code§ 67-5725. (R. pp. 526-528.) Syringa's 
motion was supported, among other things, by the then current statewide blanket purchase order 
SBPO 1308 issued to Qwest and the then current statewide blanket purchase order SBPO 1309 
issued to ENA. (R. pp. 554-854.) Syringa further supported its motion by a memorandum and 
extensive citations to the record. (R. pp. 529-535.) Syringa served its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and other pleadings that had inadvertently not been served on Qwest and 
ENA on both on April 25, 2014. (See Ex. 1 to the Affidavit of Melodie A. McQuade in Support 
of Syringa Networks, LLC's Motion to Augment the Record ("McQuade Affidavit").3) 
The hearing on Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was postponed after 
DOA filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 22, 2014 that asked the District Court to 
reconsider its decision allowing Syringa to amend Count Three. DOA contended, among other 
things, that this Court's statements regarding DOA's unlawful conduct in Syringa I were merely 
3 Syringa filed a Motion to Augment the Record with this Court on December 7, 2015 that was supported 
by the McQuade Affidavit. 
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dicta, and that this Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by commenting on the merits of 
Count Three.4 (See Ex. 2 to McQuade Affidavit.) 
The District Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider 
on June 24, 2014 ("Amendment Reconsideration Decision") in which it rejected DOA's 
contention that this Court's statements regarding the Amendments' illegality were dicta, and 
rejecting DOA's arguments that this Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction. (R. pp. 1390-
1405.) In reaching that conclusion, the District Court cited Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 
302 P.3d 18, 23 (Idaho 2013) and stated: 
In deciding that S yringa had standing to challenge to the amended 
SBPO to Qwest, the Supreme Court stated a principle of law that 
was necessary to its decision, i.e. that by improperly splitting the 
IEN RFP scope of work between ENA and Qwest, DOA caused a 
distinct and palpable injury to Syringa, who otherwise would have 
submitted a bid for the work later awarded solely to Qwest. The 
Court's determination that the amendment violated state law is not 
dicta. The Court's determination that the amendment violated state 
law is the law of this case and will be adhered to by this Court. 
(R. p. 1398.) The District Court did, however, reconsider and reverse its previous decision 
allowing Syringa to challenge the original SBPOs as "unlawful pretext to divide the scope of 
work between Qwest and ENA" on the basis that Syringa was judicially estopped from making 
that claim. (R. pp. 1399-1402.) The District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration 
concerning its decision allowing the amendment of paragraph 94 of Syringa's Complaint to 
assert that both Amendments No. 1 were issued in violation of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718A and 
67-5718. (R. pp. 1397-1399.) 
4 DOA made a similar argument in its Petition for Rehearing that was rejected by this Court. 
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The Amendment Reconsideration Decision also addressed the requirement of Idaho Code 
§ 10-1211 that "all persons ... be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be 
affected by the declaration" in actions for declaratory judgment, and concluded that Syringa's 
challenge to Amendments No. 1 required the presence of ENA and Qwest as necessary parties. 
Qwest, according to the District Court, remained a party following the remand of Count Three. 
(R. p. 1403.) ENA, on the other hand, had been dismissed, according to the Court, and was 
required to be added as a party. The District Court therefore ordered that ENA be made a party 
and that a copy of the Amended Complaint be served upon ENA and Qwest. (R. pp. 1403-
1404.) 
Syringa obtained the issuance of a summons for a Second Amended Post-Appeal 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in response to the District Court's order. Syringa added 
the following notice and reservation of rights to that summons: 
The Plaintiff obtained issuance of this Summons Concerning The 
Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint and Demand For Jury 
Trial to comply with the June 24, 2014 Memorandum Decision 
And Order Re Motion To Reconsider entered by the above court. 
Plaintiff does not admit, by obtaining issuance of this summons, 
that ENA Services, LLC is no longer a party to this case following 
remittitur by the Idaho Supreme Court on August 29, 2013 or that 
service of process is necessary to reestablish jurisdiction over ENA 
Services, LLC. 
Plaintiff further reserves all other remedies that may be available to 
it in connection with the Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint 
And Demand For Jury Trial including, but not limited to, those 
remedies that may be available to it under Rule 60 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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(See Ex. 3 to McQuade Affidavit.) Plaintiffs Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, together with the Summons for Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial were served upon ENA on July 3, 2014. (See Ex. 4 to McQuade 
Affidavit.) ENA then filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. pp. 1434-1447.) 
DOA filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment on August 11, 2014, asserting, among 
other things, that the Rescission Amendments mooted the case. (R. pp. 1448-1450, 1462-1479.) 
Qwest joined in DOA's motion. (R. pp. 1572-1574.) 
Syringa served an Amended Notice of Hearing on August 22, 2014 advising the parties 
that its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would be heard on October 10, 2014. Syringa's 
Notice stated that the scope of Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would be 
limited, pursuant to the court's June 24, 2014 Memorandum Decision and Order Re Motion To 
Reconsider, to a determination of whether SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309, as amended by 
Amendments No. 1 violate provisions of Title 67, Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code and are void by 
operation of Idaho Code § 67-5725. (See Ex. 5 to McQuade Affidavit.) DOA noticed its cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment at the same time. (See Ex. 6 to McQuade Affidavit.) 
The District Court heard arguments on ENA's Motion to Dismiss and on the DOA, 
Qwest and Syringa cross-motions for summary judgment on October 10, 2014. Counsel for 
ENA appeared with counsel for DOA and Qwest and argued in opposition to Syringa's motion. 
(Tr., p. 66, L. 21 -p. 69, L. 6.) 
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order RE Pending Dispositive 
Motions on November 10, 2014 ("Dispositive Decision"). (R. pp. 1638-1653.) In that decision, 
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the District Court noted that Quiring vs. Quiring, 944 P .2d 695 (Idaho 1997) places an 
affirmative duty on Idaho courts to raise the issue of illegality of a contract at any stage in the 
litigation without regard to whether the issue was pleaded by a party: 
(R. p. 1649.) 
The Court is not free to ignore this issue or to countenance the 
continuation of contracts that resulted from violation from state 
procurement law. The award of the SBPO to ENA, when amended 
to divide the scope of work, violated state procurement law, and is 
void. ENA' s motion to dismiss this claim is denied. ENA is 
seeking a ruling that would allow ENA to benefit from an 
improper award. In the Court's view, such a result would fly in the 
face of the Supreme Court's decision in this case. 
The Supreme Court decided this case in March, 2013. Since then, 
DOA has argued that the Supreme Court had no authority to decide 
that DOA's actions violated procurement law. DOA also argued 
that the Supreme Court's ruling that DOA violated state 
procurement law was improper dicta which this Court is free to 
ignore. The Supreme Court's ruling that DOA violated state 
procurement law by splitting work between Qwest and ENA is the 
law of the case, and is binding on the parties and this Court. The 
awards which divided the work violate state procurement law and 
are void. 
DOA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the court's November 10, 
2014 Order on November 18, 2014. (R. pp. 1654-1657.) Qwest filed a Motion for Clarification 
and/or Reconsideration on November 24, 2014 (R. pp. 1687-1691), and ENA filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration on December 8, 2014. (R. pp. 1712-1714.) The motions were all taken under 
advisement by the District Court without oral argument. 
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions to Reconsider 
on February 11, 2015 ("Reconsideration Decision"). (R. pp. 2016-2037.) In the Reconsideration 
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Decision, the District Court rejected each and every contention asserted by the Defendants; 
clarified that its order applied to both SBPOs, in their entirety; concluded that its obligation to 
apply Idaho Code § 67-5725 was fulfilled by a determination that the contracts are void; and 
reiterated that it has a duty, under Quiring vs. Quiring, to address ihe iilegality of the IEN 
procurement. (R. pp. 2016-2037.) 
At the same time that DOA, ENA, and Qwest had moved for reconsideration of the 
Dispositive Decision, Syringa submitted a proposed form of judgment that contained two 
relevant provisions drawn from Idaho Code § 67-5725. (R. pp. 2067-2068). The first element 
was that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, are void. The second element directed DOA, through 
the Administrator of the Division of Purchasing, to make a demand for repayment contemplated 
by the following provision of Idaho Code§ 67-5725: 
All contracts or agreements made in violation of the provisions of 
this chapter shall be void and any sum of money advanced by the 
state of Idaho in consideration of any such contract or agreement 
shall be repaid forthwith. In the event of refusal or delay when 
repayment is demanded by the proper officer of the state of Idaho, 
under whose authority such contract or agreement shall have been 
made or entered into, every person so refusing or delaying, 
together with his surety or sureties, shall be forthwith prosecuted at 
law for the recovery of such sum of money so advanced. 
LC. § 67-5725 (emphasis added). 
The court entered judgment on February 11, 2015 as follows (the "Judgment"): 
1. Statewide Blanket Purchase Order 1308 to Qwest 
Communications, LLC, as amended by Amendment One, is void. 
2. Statewide Blanket Purchase Order 1309 to ENA Services, 
LLC, as ai1Uended by Amended One, is void. 
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(R. p. 2038.) The Judgment was directed soleiy to the IEN Contracts, as Amended. The 
Judgment did not include any relief against Qwest or ENA because Syringa made no claim in 
Count Three against Qwest or ENA. The Judgment also did not contain the provision requested 
by Syringa pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5725 that is the subject of Syringa's cross appeal. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Syringa is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code 
§§ 12-120(3), 12-120, 12-117, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
III. ARGUMENT 
DOA, Qwest and ENA assert multiple issues on appeal. Syringa's analysis of the 
standard of review and response to each of Appellants' issues appear below. 
A. Standard of Review 
Appellants' briefs accurately describe some standards of review, but omit four standards 
relevant to this appeal. (DOA Opening Brief at 16-17; Qwest Opening Brief at 11; ENA 
Opening Brief at 13-15.) 
First, this Court "exercises free review on issues of law," including whether an issue 
decided in a prior appeal is law of the case. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 153 P .3d 
1158, 1161 (Idaho 2007). 
Second, this Court "reviews a District Court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
amend for abuse of discretion." DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 331 P .3d 491, 495 
(Idaho 2014). "A court should liberally grant a motion to amend a complaint." Id. at 497 
( citation omitted). 
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Third, this Court "has the duty to raise the issue of [ contract] illegality sua sponte" even 
if the issue was not presented below or by the parties. Pines Grazing Ass 'n, Inc. v. Flying Joseph 
Ranch, LLC, 265 P.3d 1136, 1139-40 (Idaho 2011) (citation omitted); Taylor v. AJA Servs. 
Carp., 261 P.3d 829,841 (Idaho 2011) (citation omitted) (the Court "does not concern itself as to 
the manner in which the illegality of a contract before it was brought to its attention"). "Whether 
a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and 
circumstances of each case." Pines Grazing Ass 'n, 265 P .3d at 1139-40 ( citing Trees v. Kersey, 
56 P.3d 765, 768 (Idaho 2002)). 
Fourth, "it is well-settled that where an order of a lower court is correct, but based on an 
erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory." Grabicki v. City of 
Lewiston, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (Idaho 2013) (citation omitted). This Court "will uphold the decision 
of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be found to support it." Daleiden v. Jefferson 
Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251, 80 P.3d 1067, 1071-72 (Idaho 2003) (citation omitted). 
B. The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Rule on the Legality of the Amended SBPOs. 
1. The Requirements of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act Were 
Satisfied. 
a. ENA and Qwest Were Not Required to Be Objects of a Claim for 
Relief. 
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("UDJA") provides that "[ w ]hen declaratory 
relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be 
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to 
the proceeding." LC. § 10-1211; see Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 108 P.3d 
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340, 344-45 (Idaho 2005); Tomehak v. Walker, 700 P.2d 68, 71 (Idaho 1985). UDJA does not, 
however, require plaintiffs to name all necessary and interested parties as defendants in the 
specific declaratory judgment count of a complaint. UDJA requires that only that all interested 
persons be made parties to the proceeding before any deciaraiion is entered that couid prejudice 
their interest. This rule is rooted in principles of due process: 
The rule that a court will not render a declaratory judgment unless 
all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint 
are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof is not 
merely a procedural regulation but, rather, is in recognition and 
implementation of the basic principle that due process of law 
requires that the rights of no person may be judicially determined 
without affording him or her a day in court and an opportunity to 
be heard. 
22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 204, Necessity of Making All Interested Persons 
Parties, Observation (2d Ed. 2014). Qwest and ENA were interested and necessary parties under 
UDJA because their interests could be affected by entry of the declaratory judgment sought by 
Syringa in Count Three. Qwest and ENA were not, however, the object of a claim for relief by 
Syringa and not defendants in Count Three because Count three concerned a breach of public 
duty by DOA, a governmental entity subject to the procurement statutes at issue. 
b. ENA and Qwest Were Parties to this Proceeding From the Beginning 
Who Had the Opportunity to Protect Their Interests in the JEN 
Contracts Pre-Appeal, on Appeal, and Post-Appeal. 
Syringa's Complaint alleged that Qwest and ENA had interests in the IEN Contracts, as 
Amended that could be affected by the relief sought against DOA in Count Three. These 
allegations started with the Introduction of the Complaint: 
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The DOA decision to award ENA - Syringa's partner - all of the 
substantive educational components of the IEN implementation 
and to award Qwest all of the IEN telecommunications was 
unnecessary, arbitrary and a violation oflaw. 
(Augmented R. p. 19.) More specific allegations followed in paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 
40, 44, 69, 93 and 94 of the Complaint. (Augmented R. pp. 24-33.) The allegations of Paragraph 
44 in Count One, for example, state that ENA was prohibited from using local loop providers 
other than Qwest to deliver its services: 
44. Upon information and belief, ENA, part of the IEN 
Alliance, has made numerous requests that the State use Syringa 
for the IEN technical work. See E-mail from Bob Collie, ENA, to 
Greg Lowe, Syringa, dated July 27, 2009 and attached herein as 
Exhibit D. ("ENA has requested multiple times that the State use 
any local loop provider who can deliver the quality, price and time 
requirements, similar to what we contemplated in the proposal. 
The State has rejected requests to use Syringa for the IEN technical 
work.... [t]he State has made it impossible for [ENA] to use 
Syringa or anyone other than Qwest for that matter, to provide 
100% of the local loop, backbone and core equipment ... "). 
(Augmented R. p. 26.) Following paragraph 44, paragraph 69 in Count Two alleges the 
amendment of the IEN SBPOs in violation of Idaho Code § 67-5718A and attaches Qwest 
Amendment No. 1 as Exhibit E in support of its allegation. (Augmented R. p. 29.) Exhibit E 
(Qwest Amendment No. 1) not only identifies Qwest as "general contractor for all IEN technical 
services;" it also identifies exclusive duties assigned to ENA in eight of its nine operative 
paragraphs and ends by stating "[t]he State considers Qwest and ENA as equal partners in the 
IEN project .... " (Augmented R. pp. 472-476.) 
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Count Three follows with specific claims against DOA under the following heading: 
COUNT THREE 
Declaratory Relief 
Violation of Idaho Code §67-5718A by DOA 
(Augmented R. p. 30.) The first paragraph of Count Three begins by incorporating the foregoing 
76 paragraphs of the Complaint. The allegations incorporated into Count Three from the 
preceding 76 paragraphs of the complaint included paragraphs and allegations that identified 
Qwest and ENA as parties to the proceeding (Augmented R. pp. 20-21 (117-10)), identified their 
interest in the IEN awards and Amendments No. 1 (Augmented R. pp. 29-30 (1i126-45 and 65-
76)) and identified them as "equal partners" by reference to Qwest Amendment No. 1, which is 
attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint. These incorporated paragraphs and exhibits also alleged 
that DOA violated its statutory duties under Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. 
Paragraph 94 in Count Three of the Complaint sought declaratory judgment declaring the 
amended IEN Purchase Order to Qwest void pursuant to Idaho Code §67-5725. (Augmented R. 
p. 33.) The effect of the requested declaration would not, however, be limited solely to the 
interests of Qwest. Invalidation of the amended IEN Purchase Order to Qwest would also, to the 
clear terms of Qwest Amendment No. 1 (Exhibit E to the Complaint) affect the interests of 
Qwest's "equal partner" ENA. 
Count Three sought the specific relief of a declaratory judgment against DOA because 
DOA is the governmental party that violated Idaho Code § 67-5718(2), IDAPA 38.05.01.052, 
and Idaho Code§ 67-5718A when it issued Amendments No. 1. 
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Qwest and ENA, as non-governmental parties, had an interest in the IEN SBPOs, but 
were not subject to the statutory duties that applied to DOA. It would have been inappropriate, 
in the absence of duty, for Syringa to make a claim against Qwest and ENA in Count Three.5 
SyTinga was not required under UDJA or the cases cited by Appellants to specifically name ENA 
and Qwest on the heading of Count Three or to make a claim against them in Count Three. 
Neither DOA nor Qwest has presented any authority in support of the proposition that 
Qwest and ENA were required to be "named as a defendant" or the object of a claim for relief to 
satisfy the requirements of the UDJA. The authority presented involves situations where 
necessary parties were entirely absent from the proceeding. Syringa was required to include 
ENA and Qwest in the proceedings, and they were included. 
Qwest and ENA were, as demonstrated above, parties to the pre-appeal proceedings with 
notice that their rights in the Amended SBPOs could be affected by a ruling on Count Three. 
Qwest and ENA also had the opportunity, as parties to the first appeal, to oppose Syringa's 
arguments concerning Count Three. Neither chose to do so. (See State Respondents' Brief and 
Cross-Appeal Brief, filed April 23, 2012; Defendant/Respondent Qwest's Brief, filed April 23, 
2012; Appellee ENA Services, LLC, A Division of Education Networks of America, Inc.'s 
Amended Response Brief, filed March 6, 2012.) The fact that Qwest and ENA did not oppose or 
offer argument against Count Three before the first appeal or during the first appeal does not 
5 ENA asserts as a possible defense that Syringa lacks standing as to ENA because Syringa sought no relief 
against ENA in Count Three and that the award to ENA did not cause damages to Syringa. (ENA Opening Brief, 
p. 50.) Count Three challenges DOA's IEN procurement award process. Syringa Networks, LLC, 305 P.3d at 505. 
Syringa was not required to sue ENA for DOA's statutory violation. ENA's previewed defense is meritless. 
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mean they were not parties to the proceeding involving Count Three. It means only that they 
offered no direct argument in opposition to Syringa's prosecution of Count Three. 
It is Syringa's contention that Qwest and ENA remained parties to the proceedings upon 
the remar1d of Count T11ree, even if it v,as limited at the time of remand to the Qwest contract, as 
amended, because they each had an interest in the scope of work described in Qwest Amendment 
No. 1 that was attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint. 
The District Court agreed that Qwest remained a party. (R. p. 1403 (Amendment 
Reconsideration Decision).) The District Court disagreed with Syringa's contention that ENA 
remained a party after remand, but allowed the Amendment of Syringa's complaint to challenge 
both IEN contracts, saying, "ENA must be made a party to this action." (R. p. 1303 
(Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) Although Syringa disagreed with the conclusion of 
the District Court, it issued and served the Summons For Second Amended Post Appeal 
Complaint on ENA as discussed above. ENA appeared by filing A Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 
2014. (R. pp. 1434-1436.) ENA also presented argument opposing Syringa's summary judgment 
motion. (Tr. p. 66, I. 21 - p. 69, 1. 6.) Qwest joined in DOA's summary judgment briefing. (R. 
pp. 1480-1483, 1572-1574.) 
Qwest and ENA were involved in every stage of this case and the UDJA's requirement 
that all necessary parties be part of the "proceeding" was satisfied. See I.C. § 10-1211. This 
Court's directive to proceed with the declaratory judgment action included the inherent direction 
that all parties to the action on the remand remain as parties. To give effect to this Court's 
directive that the declaratory judgment action proceed, ENA and Qwest had to be parties to the 
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proceeding post-appeal. See Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at 512; Hartman, 108 P.3d at 344-45; 
Tomehak, 700 P.2d at 71. To avoid any question concerning the status of ENA after amendment 
of the Complaint was allowed, the District Court required the service of a second summons on 
ENA. 
The District Court, in other words, took all necessary measures to ensure that all entities 
made necessary by UDJA for the resolution of Count Three were parties to the post-appeal 
proceedings and correctly concluded, before entering summary judgment, that "all necessary 
parties have beenjoined and the Court has jurisdiction." (R. p. 1646.) 
c. Even if ENA and Qwest Were Not Properly Joined, the District 
Court's Decision is Not Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
Qwest and ENA were parties to this proceeding from the beginning. Even if, however, 
this Court determines that Qwest and ENA were required to be listed on the heading for Count 
Three and that Qwest and ENA were not properly joined because they were not listed in the 
heading, their absence did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction to enter judgment on Count 
Three. 
In Hartman v. United Heritage Property and Casualty Company, this Court addressed 
whether a declaratory judgment was void for failure to join necessary parties. 108 P .3d at 344-
45. The Hartman court began by explaining that it "narrowly construe[s] what constitutes a void 
judgment," and that a judgment can be void based on lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter 
jurisdiction, or where it is entered in violation of due process. Id. at 344. The Hartman court 
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found, however, that "[t]he fact that a party who is deemed necessary or indispensable is not 
joined in the lawsuit does not render the judgment void." Id. 
The Hartman court quoted the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in 
Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 1998), which construed F.R.C.P. 19(b), the federal 
version ofl.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) govemingjoinder: 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) provides that persons who 
claim an interest relating to the matter litigated and persons whose 
presence in a suit is necessary to accord complete relief between 
those who are already parties shall be joined in the action if they 
are subject to service of process and their joinder in the litigation 
will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Rule 19(b) 
then explains that if such a person "cannot be made a party, the 
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the 
action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." 
As the emphasized language of Rule 19(b) indicates, however, the 
requirement that a case shall not proceed absent joinder of all 
indispensable persons is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but 
rather an equitable rule "both in its origin and nature." 
Id. (citing Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations omitted) (first 
emphasis in original) (second emphasis added). The Hartman court explained that the failure to 
join an indispensable party "was an affirmative defense that must be raised in the declaratory 
judgment action" by motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7), "after which the burden falls on the 
plaintiffs to join all 'parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration."' Hartman, 108 P.3d at 345 (citing LC. § 10-1211 and Tomehak, 700 P.2d at 71). 
Hartman provides the applicable procedure for a defendant to follow who believes that 
an indispensable party is missing from an action. That procedure gives the plaintiff the ability, 
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under I.R.C.P. 19(a), to join any necessary parties to the action. I.R.C.P. 19(a) mandates that a 
court shall order joinder of the party unless the person cannot be made a party. I.R.C.P. 
19(a)(l)-(2). If joinder is not possible, the court must still "determine whether in equity and 
good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, 
the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2). 
DOA did not assert the affirmative defense that Syringa had failed to join an 
indispensible party and did not follow the procedure outlined in Hartman pre-appeal. That 
procedure would have given Syringa the chance to clarify, pre-appeal, that Qwest and ENA were 
parties to the Count Three proceeding or to move to join ENA and Qwest as defendants to Count 
Three if the District Court determined that specific joinder in Count Three was necessary. 
Instead, DOA attempted, post-appeal, to attack the District Court's pre-appeal jurisdiction. 
DOA' s attempt to reach back and raise a pre-appeal issue post-appeal, if accepted, would 
retroactively deprive Syringa of its ability under I.R.C.P. 19 and Hartman to join necessary 
parties. DOA's attempt should be rejected for that reason. 
Additionally, because this Court found in Hartman that the issue of failure to join a 
necessary party under Idaho Code § 10-1211 is not jurisdictional and that a judgment entered in 
absence of a necessary party "does not render the judgment void," DOA's argument that the 
District Court and this Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Count Three is without merit. 
Hartman, l 08 P .3d at 344. 
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2. The Rescission Amendments Did Not Moot Syringa's Claim. 
a. Rescission was Futile Because Contracts that are Void Cannot be 
Rescinded. 
One year and three months after the issuance of this Court's opinion in Syringa I and 
more than five years after the commencement of operations under the IEN Contracts, as 
Amended, DOA, ENA, and Qwest tried to moot this case by agreeing to rescind Amendments 
No. 1. (R. pp. 1462-1479.) The District Court properly rejected this move because void contracts 
cannot be rescinded. 
(i) The IEN Contracts, as Amended by Amendments No. 1 Are 
Void. 
This Court explained that the IEN contracts, as amended, violate Idaho Code § 67-
5718(2) because: 
By amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer 
furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect, 
changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation of LC. 
§ 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052. 
Syringa I, 305 P .3d at 506 ( citations and quotation marks omitted). Employing the same logic, 
the District Court reasoned that the illegality of the IEN contracts, as amended by Amendments 
No. 1 extended to a violation ofldaho Code§ 67-5718A: 
The amended contracts are contrary to state law because "[t]he 
RFP did not seek bids for one contract to provide the backbone and 
a separate contract to be thee-rate service provider." The logic of 
the Court's reasoning also leads to the conclusion that a multiple 
award that permitted contractors to provide different property 
would also violate Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. 
(R. p. 1396 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision) (quoting Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 505).) The 
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District Court went on to conclude: 
The Court's determination that the amendment violated state law is 
not dicta. The Court determination that the amendment violated 
state law is the law of this case and will be adhered to by this 
Court. Contrary to DOA's argument, the Supreme Court has made 
a determination that the February 26, 2009 amendments which 
divided the scope of work between Qwest and ENA were contrary 
to law. 
(R. p. 1398 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) As this Court explained, "[a]ll contracts 
made in violation of these statutes are void and any money advanced by the State in 
consideration of such contracts must be repaid." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 504 (citing LC. § 67-
5725). Amendments No. 1 are void because they violate Idaho Code §§ 67-5718(2) and 67-
5718A. 
(ii) Void Contracts Cannot Be Rescinded. 
Idaho authority is scant concerning whether void contracts can be rescinded but clear on 
the point that "[Void] contracts are deemed never to have existed in the eyes of the law." 
Thompson v. Ebbert, 160 P.3d 754, 757 (Idaho 2007) (brackets in original); see BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY at 350 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a void contract as "[a] contract that is of no legal 
effect, so that there is really no contract in existence at all"). Starting from the premise that void 
contracts have no existence, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a void contract cannot be 
rescinded because, in contrast to a voidable contract, a void contract never legally existed. See 
Muncy v. City of O'Fallon, 145 S.W.3d 870, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (city contract did not 
comply with statute and could not be rescinded because it was void); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Greatbanc Trust Co, 887 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (contract could not be rescinded 
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that trustee had admitted was void ab initio ); TTSI Irrevocable Trust v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 
60 So.3d 1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (rescission not available where contract found to 
be void rather than voidable); City of Beaumont v. Moore, 202 S.W.2d 448, 452-53 (Tex. 1947) 
("VVhere a contract is ultra vires and void there is nothing to rescind."); Loxley S., L.L. C. v. W 
Express, Inc., CIV.A. 10-0024-KD-N, 2011 WL 2469823, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2011) ("the 
Agreement is void because it was made in violation of the Alabama subdivision regulation 
statutes. In Drinkard v. Embalmers Supply Co., 14 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1943), the court held 
that where a contract was void 'there is no occasion for a rescission; there is nothing to rescind.' . 
. . Accordingly, there is no agreement to rescind (or enforce) in this case."); American Cas. Co. 
of Reading, Pa. v. Mem 'l Hosp. Ass 'n, 223 F. Supp. 539, 542 (E.D. Wis. 1963) ("Technically, a 
void contract is a nullity and there is nothing to rescind."). 
The Rescission Amendments were futile. This case could not, and was not rendered 
moot by the Rescission Amendments. 
b. The Rescission Amendments Defied Syringa I and Could Not Restore 
the Status Quo. 
The District Court could not give effect to the Rescission Amendments without ignoring 
this Court's remand for proceedings consistent with its opinion. This Court explained that 
Syringa was injured by DOA's issuance of the IEN Contracts, as Amended because the process 
deprived Syringa of the opportunity to bid separately for broadband connectivity services. 
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. If the District Court had permitted Appellants to rescind 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 33 
3438924_8 (5821-112] 
Amendments No. 1 and accepted Appellants' mootness argument, the injury identified by this 
Court would not have been redressed. 
Further, recognition of the attempted rescission would have been improper because 
"rescission requires restoration to the status quo." White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (Idaho 
2004). Appellants' supposed rescission could not restore the parties to the status quo because 
Appellants performed under the Amended SBPOs for years and never cured or attempted to cure 
the impact of Amendments No. 1 while it was in effect, or repay the tens of millions of dollars 
paid for the work done according to Amendments No. 1. Restoration of the status quo of the 
Original SBPOs, for example, would have required Qwest and ENA to be competitors for the 
provision of "technical network services" and "internet services" ( assigned exclusively to Qwest 
by Amendments No. 1) nunc pro tune to 2009. To this point, the record reflects no change in the 
operation of the IEN and no new opportunities for telecommunication providers to provide 
service to the IEN offered or realized as a result of the Rescission Amendments. Indeed, voiding 
the IEN Contracts, as Amended was the only remedy that could redress the injury sustained by 
Syringa. 
As the attempted rescission was not effective, Count Three was not moot and remained 
ripe for adjudication, and the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Count Three. 
c. Recognized Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine Preclude a Finding 
of Mootness Even if the Rescission Amendments were Effective. 
(i) DOA Could Return to its Illegal Behavior at Any Time. 
Idaho follows federal law in recognizing the voluntary cessation exception to the 
mootness doctrine. In O 'Boskey v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Boise, this 
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Court explained that generally, "[ w ]here the conduct causing injury has been discontinued, the 
dispute is moot .... " 739 P.2d 301, 306 (Idaho 1987). However, if a defendant voluntarily 
ceases its behavior, "the trial court must be convinced that 'there is no reasonable expectation 
that the wrong will be repeated."' Id. (citing United States v. W.T Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,633, 
(1953)). And, "the burden on the defendant to make this showing 'is a heavy one."' O'Boskey, 
739 P.2d at 306 (citing W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633). "The reason for so burdening the 
defendant lies in inevitable questions concerning the motive of the defendant's voluntary 
cessation." O'Boskey, 739 P.2d at 306. Further, "a party cannot conjure up mootness by ceasing 
the challenged conduct only for practical or strategic reasons-such as avoiding litigation." 
McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138 (D. Idaho 2013). "Courts also hesitate to 
find a case moot when a party voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct but continues to argue 
the lawfulness of the challenged conduct." Id. ( emphasis added). 
The O 'Boskey court ruled that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a 
mootness argument and entering an injunction against the defendant where the defendant only 
changed its disputed policy after an adverse appeal decision and an adverse District Court 
decision. O'Boskey, 739 P.2d at 306. Similarly, in this case DOA attempted to rescind 
Amendments No. 1 to moot this case and escape the impact of an adverse decision from this 
Court in Syringa I. Similar to the defendant in O 'Boskey, DOA continued IEN operations 
without change after Syringa I, never offered a substantive defense of Amendments No. 1 and 
persists in the assertion of procedural and jurisdictional arguments that are designed to remove 
the IEN Contracts, as Amended, from the reach of judicial review. (See DOA Opening Brief.) 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 35 
3438924_8 (5821-112] 
If this case is found moot, DOA remains free to engage in the same contract manipulation 
that this Court renounced without meeting its burden of showing "there is no reasonable 
expectation that the wrong will be repeated." O'Boskey, 739 P.2d at 306. Under these 
circumstances, the voluntary cessation exception forecloses a finding of rnootness. 
(ii) There is a Substantial Public Interest in the Determination of 
Syringa's Declaratory Judgment Action. 
The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is also an obstacle to the 
Rescission Amendments. "Under this exception, even if the case is determined to be moot, if the 
issue presented is one of substantial public interest, the Court may address the issue for future 
direction and guidance." Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 
912 P.2d 644, 652 (Idaho 1996) (ruling that despite a sunset provision in a challenged regulation, 
case not moot because there was a public interest in the issue of whether the regulations 
complied with the state constitutional provision concerning thoroughness of the education 
system) (citing Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 887 P.2d 35, 37 (Idaho 1994)); see 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 119 P .3d 624, 626 (Idaho 2005) ( claim 
concerning use of public funds in elections not moot even though election had passed because 
there was public interest in resolution of the issue). 
In this case, Syringa has challenged whether the executive branch ofldaho's government 
can violate procurement law by amending competitively bid public contracts worth tens of 
millions of dollars after the bidding has been closed and later agree to rescind the unlawful 
amendments after substantial performance and without re-opening the contracts to competitive 
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bidding. The public has a substantial interest in determination of this action. As this Court 
pointed out in its decision in this case: "Subsection (3) [ of LC. § 67-5718A] obviously intends, 
for the benefit of the taxpayers, that the multiple bidders who are awarded contracts will remain 
as competitors, which will only occur if they are furnishing the same or similar prnpcrty. Syringa 
I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). Just as Idaho's procurement laws benefit Idaho taxpayers, 
violations of those laws injure taxpayers. 
The public has a substantial interest in determination of this action because DOA violated 
public contracting laws that were established for the benefit of taxpayers and thus the Rescission 
Amendments could not moot this case. 
(iii) DO A's Conduct is Capable of Repetition But Evading Review. 
Idaho also recognizes that "an exception to the mootness doctrine exists if the case is 
capable of repetition yet evading review." A clear example of the problem addressed by this 
exception is provided by Idaho School for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board 
of Education, in which this Court explained: 
Theoretically, the Board could promulgate new standards every 
year, sunsetting the previous year's standards. If this were the case, 
then each time a declaratory judgment action is filed claiming that 
the method of school funding is not "thorough" under that year's 
standards, the District Court could dismiss the case as moot 
claiming that those standards had been sunsetted. Thus, a situation 
arises wherein the case is repetitive or continuing, but is incapable 
of being resolved. 
912 P.2d at 651 (holding the case was not moot). If this case were dismissed for mootness, the 
DOA could continue to amend contracts in violation ofldaho Code§§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2) 
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and simply "rescind" those unlawful amendments each time they are challenged in order to moot 
the case and avoid review. 
In summary, Appellants' attempted rescission ab initio of the Amendments No. 1 was 
ineffective because void contracts cannot be rescinded. Further, even if this Court were to hold 
that DOA and its contractors could rescind Amendments No. 1, it should also find that this case 
falls within exceptions to the mootness doctrine that preclude dismissal on that basis. 
C. The District Court Correctly Ruled that the Amended SBPOs Violate Idaho 
Procurement Statutes. 
1. The District Court's Decision was Consistent with this Court's Decision in 
Syringal. 
a. The District Court Properly Followed the Law of the Case Established 
by Syringa I. 
This Court unambiguously stated in Syringa /that DOA violated the law.6 "By amending 
the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer furnishing the same or similar property, the 
State has, in effect, changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation of LC. § 67-
5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). This Court 
specifically noted that DOA attempted to "do indirectly what it [was] prevented by law from 
doing directly," and that this two-step approach was "obviously not permissible when considered 
in light of subsection (3)" of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). In this 
Court's words, DOA's actions constituted a "mere scheme[] to evade law" that the Court would 
"sweep ... aside as so much rubbish." Id. at 506 ( citation omitted). 
6 Going a step further, this Court unambiguously stated that DOA obviously violated the law. Syringa I, 
305 P.3 at 505. 
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These legal principles and rules were necessary to this Court's conclusion that Syringa 
was injured by DOA's conduct, and had standing to redress the injury. According to Syringa I, 
Amendments No. 1 made a material change to the description of the work sought by the IEN 
RFP and Syringa suffered a "distinct a.11d palpable injury not suffered by all Idaho citizens" 
because "Syringa would have bid to perform the work specified in the amended contract awarded 
to Qwest." Id. ("Syringa has standing to challenge the amended contract to Qwest because it 
constituted, in effect, changing the RFP after the bids were opened."). 
DOA and Qwest contend this Court's conclusions regarding the illegality of DOA's 
actions are non-binding dicta. (DOA Opening Brief at 25-30; Qwest Opening Brief at 11-16.) 
This Court's conclusions regarding DOA's unlawful conduct were not statements "said in 
passing."7 They were necessary to this Court's ultimate conclusion regarding standing. As such, 
they are the law of the case which govern the remand and this appeal. Spur Prods. Corp., 153 
P .3d at 1162 ( citation omitted). In fact, Syringa I cannot be read any other way, at least in good 
faith. 8 The District Court correctly recognized and applied these conclusions in its decisions. 
(R. pp. 2028-2030 (Reconsideration Decision), 1649-1650 (Dispositive Decision), and 1398 
7 "Obiter dictum" translates to "something said in passing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1102 (8th ed. 
2004). Dicta are statements made in an opinion that are not necessary to the court's decision and, therefore, are 
persuasive but not precedential. Id. "Ratio decidendi," which translates to "the reason for deciding," is the 
"principle or rule of law on which a court's decision is founded." Id. at 1290. The reason for deciding an issue is 
precedential and law of the case. See Spur Prods. Corp., 153 P.3d at 1162. This Court's conclusion that DOA 
violated the law was necessary to its conclusion on standing, and is therefore binding ratio decidendi, not 
persuasive-but-non-binding obiter dictum. 
8 It seems everyone but Appellants recognized the import of this Court's decision. The federal government 
stopped funding the JEN after Syringa I, leaving Idaho taxpayers on the hook for DOA's refusal to acknowledge the 
obvious significance of this Court's decision. (R. p. 1650 (Dispositive Decision).) 
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(Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) 
What's more, this Court already rejected DOA's arguments regarding Syringa I. After 
Syringa I was released, DOA filed a petition for rehearing arguing that this Court should not 
have addressed the iegaiity of DOA's actions because the appeal focused solely on standing. 
(See Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Petition for Rehearing, filed May 3, 2013, at 
1-8.)9 This Court denied the petition. (See Idaho Supreme Court Order dated July 11, 2013, p. 
1.) In the words of the District Court, "that boat has sailed." (Tr. p. 28, 11. 17-18; see Tr. p. 36, I. 
25 (noting the petition for rehearing was rejected).) 
Even if this Court's conclusion that DOA violated the law was dicta, the analysis is sound 
and the District Court did not err by following it. Though dicta is not binding, it is be persuasive. 
Indeed, this Court frequently issues guidance for lower courts in the form of dicta. E.g., Vavold 
v. State, 218 P.3d 388, 390 (Idaho 2009) ("[W]e note, admittedly by way of dicta, that we agree 
with the District Court's conclusion that Estrada did not announce a new rule of law."); 
Chandler v. Hayden, 215 P.3d 485, 492 (Idaho 2009) ("Although we recognize that this portion 
of the opinion is dicta ... we address this issue in order to provide guidance to the District Court 
in remand."). Even if correct, the contention by DOA and Qwest that this Court's statements in 
Syringa I are dicta gets them nowhere: the District Court faithfully followed this Court's 
guidance, and, in any case, reached its decision on a factual record developed on summary 
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judgment. That is not error. 
b. The District Court Is Not the Arbiter of this Court's Jurisdiction. In 
Any Case, Syringa I was a Proper Exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction. 
DOA and Qwest argue that the District Court erroneously "interpreted" this Court's 
decision in Syringa /because Syringa I exceeded this Court's jurisdiction. (DOA Opening Brief 
at 27-29; Qwest Opening Brief at 13-16.) However, by deciding Syringa I, this Court implicitly 
concluded it had appellate jurisdiction to decide the case the way it did. This Court's exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction should be treated as "law of the case" shielded from collateral attack in the 
same fashion as its substantive decision. Neilsen & Co. v. Cassia & Twin Falls Cnty. Joint Class 
A Sch. Dist. 151, 647 P.2d 773, 775 (Ct. App. Idaho 1982) ("[T]he court in Neilson I necessarily 
found that the losing contract had standing, because it instructed the trial court to award the 
contractor damages. Although Neilson I does not address specifically the issues of standing, and 
therefore the opinion's weight as authority for the proposition ... is lessened, the doctrine of the 
'law of the case' prohibits us from reviewing the Supreme Court's finding."). Further, a party 
seeking to challenge a decision of this Court must do so by filing a petition for rehearing, which 
DOA did. Id. at 776. This Court rejected the petition. This Court is the arbiter of its appellate 
jurisdiction. The District Court is not. The District Court was compelled to follow this Court's 
conclusions, in Syringa I and on rehearing, that it had jurisdiction to decide Syringa I the way it 
9 DOA acknowledged this Court's conclusion that DOA violated the law in its petition for rehearing. (See 
Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Petition for Rehearing, filed May 3, 2013, at 2 ("[T]he Court opined 
that the amendments violated the statute.") and 8 ("In essence, this Court opined that the amendment to the SBPOs 
violated I.C. § 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052, and that, as a result, Syringa has standing to challenge that 
amendment."). Having recognized that this Court "opined that the amendments violated the statute," DOA cannot 
now pretend that this Court did not. 
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did. 
This Court can defend its own jurisdiction against Defendants' collateral attack; it does 
not need Syringa to do so. Regardless, this Court had jurisdiction to decide Syringa I the way it 
did. This Court has a statutorv dutv to "nass upon and determine all the questions of law ., ., i 
involved in the case presented upon ... appeal, and necessary to the final determination of the 
case." LC. § 1-205. 
Although Idaho Code § 1-205 applies, by its terms, when a new trial is granted, this 
Court has applied the statute to the context of preliminary decisions such as standing. Doe v. 
State, 352 P.3d 500, 504 (Idaho 2015) ("Because we remand to the District Court, we must 
address the issue in Doe's original petition . . . as it is a question of law necessary to 
determination of the case.") (citation omitted); see also Cummings v. Cummings, 765 P.2d 697, 
701 (Ct. App. Idaho 1988) ("Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a judgment upon an 
issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance for other issues 
on remand."). 
Doe v. State is particularly on point. There, the District Court concluded that an out-of-
state resident did not have standing to obtain a determination whether he was required to register 
as a sex offender in Idaho. 352 P.3d at 503. This Court overturned the standing conclusion. And 
it went further. Recognizing its duty to address legal issues necessary to determination of the 
case, the Court addressed the merits: 
The District Court, having dismissed the petition for lack of 
standing, did not rule on the issue of whether Doe's Washington 
offense was substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense requiring 
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registration. Because we remand to the District Court, we must 
address the issue in Doe's original petition-whether his 
Washington offense is substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense 
requiring offender registration-as it is a question oflaw necessary 
to determination of the case. LC. § 1-205 .... 
Doe, 352 P.3d at 504 ( emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Syringa I, DOA' s unlawful conduct was a question of law that was 
necessary to the final determination of the case. As such, this Court had jurisdiction to address 
the issue under Idaho Code § 1-205 and Doe v. State. 
In addition, as a practical matter, standing is not always cleanly separate from the merits 
of a case. Some discussion of the merits--or at least the governing law or contract-is often 
necessary to identify and define the scope of the plaintiffs injury. For example, in State v. 
Phillip Morris, Inc., the State argued it had standing because funds were unlawfully withheld 
from it under arbitration agreements. 354 P.3d 187, 193 (Idaho 2015). In addressing the State's 
standing, this Court looked to the contracts and agreements at issue: 
[U]nder the MSA, funds may be disbursed from the DP A only 
when disputes are "resolved with finality." As to Idaho, only the 
year 2003 will be resolved with "finality" by the Panel. Thus, the 
State would not have been entitled to DP A funds under the terms 
of the MSA .... Simply put, the State's failure to receive funds to 
which it is not entitled under the MSA does not constitute injury. 
Id. at 195-96 ( emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Doe v. State, this Court analyzed the applicable statutes to identify and 
define the plaintiffs injury: 
The Idaho Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act (SORA) 
requires a person sentenced for an offense identified in the Act to 
register with the state's central sexual offender registry 
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("Registry"). LC. § 18-8306(1). In particular, a person convicted 
of violating Idaho Code section 18-1506 is required to register. I. C. 
§ 18-8304(1)(a). The Registry is maintained on a publicly 
accessible website. SORA applies in relevant part to anyone who 
"has been convicted of any crime ... in another jurisdiction ... that 
is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) 
. .. and enters this state to establish residence or for employment 
purposes .... " I.C. § 18-8304(1)(b). "Employed" means full-time or 
part-time employment for more than 10 consecutive working days 
or an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year. I.C. § 
18-8303(6). 
352 P.3d at 503. Based on this statutory analysis, this Court determined that the plaintiff had 
alleged a current harm and, therefore, had standing. Id. 
Consistent with Phillip Morris and Doe, some discussion of the merits was necessary in 
Syringa I to identify and define Syringa's injury and determine how the injury could be 
redressed. As in Phillip Morris and Doe, the statutes are clear, and the legal analysis is not 
difficult: DOA's actions were "obviously not permissible when considered in light of subsection 
(3)" of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. Syringa I, 305 P.3d. at 505 (emphasis added). The Court's 
analysis of procurement law was well within this Court's jurisdiction. 
Finally, despite DOA and Qwest's dogged insistence to the contrary, the issue of 
illegality was brought up in the first appeal. Syringa raised the issue in its briefing, going so far 
as to say that the issue was "squarely before this Court." (Syringa Networks' Reply Brief, filed 
June 4, 2012 at 2-4.) In fact, Members of this Court were keenly interested in the legality of the 
contracts. (Oral Argument Recording, Disc 1, at 06:24-08:40; 11:00-12:52; 27:40-28:35; 30:30-
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31 :37; 32:30-37: 15; 48:00-51 :30).10 
In the initial appeal, as well as in this one, the Defendants repeatedly refused to "take off 
the blinders" and address the obvious statutory violation. In the initial appeal, as in this one, the 
Court is not obligated to mirror Defendants' myopic focus on procedurai issues. It was free then, 
and is free now, to address the DOA's failure to abide by the law. 
In arguing that this Court lacked jurisdiction to decide Syringa I as it did, DOA and 
Qwest do not cite a single case, and Syringa has found none, where an inferior court purports to 
delineate the extent of a superior court's' jurisdiction. It seems self-evident that a lower court 
does not have the authority to do so, particularly where the parties' jurisdictional arguments were 
raised and rejected by the superior court on rehearing. 
DOA and Qwest rely heavily on cases from the federal courts. (DOA Opening Brief at 
27-29; Qwest Opening Brief at 13-16 (both citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), Hill v. 
Houston, 764 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1985), Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). These cases, of 
course, are not binding. Nor are they persuasive. Federal courts exercise only the limited 
jurisdiction granted to them under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. By contrast, as this 
Court has recognized, it has "inherent power to render decisions regarding Idaho law." Sunshine 
Mining Co. v. Allendal Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Idaho 1983). Moreover, as discussed 
above, this Court routinely addresses legal issues that define a plaintiffs injury and guide the 
10 Justice Jim Jones went so far as to tell DOA that the Court could handle the standing question; he was 
interested in DOA's statutory authority for splitting the award. (Oral Argument Recording, Disc l, at 32:00-38:00). 
DOA failed to provide statutory authority for its actions. Id. Instead, it insisted that the RFP allowed it to pick and 
choose who would provide what service, and that the award was split geographically. Id. As this Court recognized, 
the award was not split geographically and the RFP does not supersede statutes. 305 P.3d at 504,505 & n.l. 
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lower courts on remand as directed by Idaho Code§ 1-205. In any case, none of the authority 
cited by DOA or Qwest involves an inferior court policing the superior court's jurisdiction, or a 
superior court allowing a collateral jurisdictional attack in a second appeal in the same case. 
2. The District Court Properly invalidated the Original SBPOs, As Amended 
by Amendments No. 1. 
a. Syringa Presented Evidence in Support of Its Summary Judgment 
Motion that was Not Rebutted by Respondents. 
Syringa demonstrated in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that the IEN 
Contracts, as Amended, were illegal and void. (R. pp. 529-535.) Syringa relied on the 
documents relevant to the IEN procurement, including the IEN RFP, DOA's response to a 
request for information concerning the end-to-end solution described in the IEN RFP, SBPO 
1308 to Qwest, SBPO 1309 to ENA, Amendments No. 1 to SBPOs 1308 and 1309, and 
subsequent amendments. (R. pp. 530-532.) Syringa also relied on deposition testimony from 
DOA purchasing administrator Bill Bums who admitted that Amendments No. 1 changed the 
IEN contracts from contracts for the "same or similar" property and services to contracts for 
dissimilar property and services. (R. pp. 532-532.) 
Syringa argued, based on the procurement documents, including Amendments No. 1, and 
the testimony of DOA purchasing administrator Bill Bums that "the material facts are clear and 
undisputed" and that Amendments No. 1 split the IEN project into separate contracts for 
dissimilar services in violation of Idaho Code§§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2). (R. pp. 532-534.) 
Syringa further argued that this Court's decision provided a clear analysis of the applicable 
procurement statutes and that DOA's issuance of Amendments No. 1 did not comply with those 
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statutes. (R. pp. 533-534.) Syringa did not rely solely on Syringa I in moving for summary 
judgment but set forth the applicable facts and law which included this Court's decision. 
DOA made no argument that the procurement documents were ambiguous, offered no 
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procurement statutes in opposition to Syringa's motion. Instead, DOA offered jurisdictional and 
procedural arguments, affidavits with inadmissible testimony to the effect that DOA had not 
"intended" Amendments No. 1 to "contractually limit the services available from Qwest and 
ENA under SBPOs 1308 and 1309" (R. pp. 1122-1123 (Aff. of Greg Zickau at ,r,r 37-40)), and 
the contention that the Rescission Amendments rendered the case moot. (R. pp. 1546-1571; see 
also Ex. 1 to the Affidavit of Melodie A. McQuade in Support of Syringa Networks, LLC's 
Supplemental Motion to Augment the Record ("Supplemental McQuade Affidavit"). 11 ) DOA 
also presented irrelevant hearsay testimony concerning Syringa's purported unwillingness to 
divide up IEN territory between Qwest and Syringa. (R. pp. 1121-1122 (Aff. of Greg Zickau at 
,r,r 33-36; see also Ex. 1 to Supplemental McQuade Affidavit.) 
To the extent DOA argues it "has not been given an opportunity to present and argue 
evidence substantiating its defenses to Count Three of Syringa's Complaint," the Record reflects 
otherwise. (DOA Opening Brief at p. 28 n. 8.) The evidence that was presented, however, was 
of no import. The evidence concerning the "intent" of DOA in imposing Amendments No. 1 was 
immaterial because the Amendments are unambiguous and DOA's evidence of intent is 
11 Syringa filed a Supplemental Motion to Augment the Record with this Court on December 8, 2015 that 
was supported by an affidavit attaching one document: Plaintiff's Rule 56(e) Objections to Affidavits and 
Deposition Testimony filed by the Defendant Idaho Department of Administration, filed October 3, 2014. 
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irrelevant. (See Ex. 1 to Supplemental McQuade Affidavit.) The same is true regarding the 
proposed hearsay evidence alleging that Syringa did not want to "divide up" IEN territory with 
Qwest. (See Ex. 1 to Supplemental McQuade Affidavit.) 
Prnsented with undisputed facts that Amendments No. 1 changed the IEN SBPOs so they 
no longer requested the "same or similar services" from Qwest and ENA, the unambiguous 
language of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2), and this Court's decision, the District 
Court correctly ruled that Amendments No. 1 unlawfully divided the IEN project into separate 
contracts for dissimilar services in violation of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2), and 
IDAPA 38.01.01.052. (R. pp. 1649-1651 (Dispositive Decision), pp. 2028-2030 
(Reconsideration Decision).) 
b. The District Court Properly Determined that the IEN Contracts, As 
Amended, Violate the Law and are Void. 
DOA and Qwest contend that the District Court erred by holding that the IEN Contracts, 
as Amended, are void. In support of their position, they argue that only Amendments No. 1 are 
unlawful and that the original IEN contracts should be restored. None of the multiple reasons 
advanced for this contention, however, square with the holding in Syringa I that Syringa suffered 
an injury "that is alleged to have been caused by the challenged conduct and that can be 
redressed by judicial relief." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. That relief, for Syringa, which was 
foreclosed by the description in the RFP from bidding separately on the "technical network 
services" and "internet services" assigned exclusively to Qwest by Amendments No. 1, was to 
declare the IEN Contracts, as Amended void and to open a new competitive bidding process for 
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"telecommunications services and equipment for the IEN" as required by Idaho Code § 67-
5745E. 
(i) The Only Remedy Available to Redress the Injury Sustained 
by Syringa as a Result of the Material Change Made to the 
IEN Scope of Work by Amendments No. 1 Is a Judgment 
Declaring the IEN Contracts, As Amended, to be Void. 
DOA Director Michael Gwartney made it clear in his March 19, 2010 Affidavit that 
Amendments No. 1 made material changes to the identical IEN contracts that were memorialized 
by SBPOs 1308 and 1309. Mr. Gwartney testified: 
After the initial award, Administration then unilaterally determined 
how best to divide the work between the two awardees/contractors. 
Administration's determination was based upon the individual 
strengths of each awardees/contractors' proposals. For example, 
ENA had expertise in providing E-rate services and providing 
video teleconferencing operations. Qwest had expertise in 
providing the technical operations (i.e., the backbone). Before 
Amendment 1 to SBPO 01308 and SBPO 01309 were issued, 
Administration contemplated various ways to divide the 
responsibilities between Qwest and ENA, including but not limited 
to dividing the services to be provided by Qwest and ENA 
regionally. However, the division of responsibilities reflected in 
the Amendments 1 s is a reflection of what Administration believed 
would best serve the State of Idaho and the schools. 
* * * 
While I understand Syringa 's frustration, the fact is that Qwest 
was awarded the technical services portion of JEN (i.e., the 
backbone). ENA was not. Just as both Syringa and IRON, the 
other backbone partner in ENA's proposal are not directly 
benefitting from the IEN contract, because of the division of 
responsibilities, some of Qwest's listed partners are not directly 
benefitting from its IEN contract ( e.g., Cisco systems, Inc) ... This 
is not the result of some conspiracy to "shut out" Syringa, IRON, 
or even Cisco; it is simply the natural consequence of the division 
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of work under the contracts. 
(Augmented R. pp. 735-736 (Aff. of J. Michael Gwartney at ,r 11).) Mr. Gwartney's affidavit 
testimony is consistent with the language of Amendments No. 1 and the clear fact that 
Amendments No. 1 materially changed the original IEN contracts by stripping the provision of 
technical network services from ENA's contract. Although the use of language was different, 
this Court treated Amendments No. 1 as material amendments by stating: 
The separate contracts as amended no longer conform to the RFP's 
description of the property to be acquired. The description of 
property to be provided by Qwest under its amended contract is not 
a minor deviation from the property to be provided by the 
successful bidder under the RFP, nor is the property to be provided 
by ENA under its amended contract. 
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). 
Syringa has been unable to find Idaho case law, other than the decision of this Court in 
this case, that addresses the effect of illegal amendments on otherwise valid government 
contracts. 12 Courts in other states have, however, addressed the issue. These courts have held 
that material amendments to competitively bid public contracts are impermissible and have ruled 
12 DOA and Qwest cite to Knowlton v. Mudd, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. Idaho 1989) for the proposition that 
an unlawful contract amendment has no effect on the underlying contract. Knowlton involved a contract amendment 
that was voidable because one of the parties to the amendment lacked capacity. 775 P.2d at 155-56. The Court of 
Appeals upheld the District Court's decision finding the amendment void and left the original contract that had not 
been challenged intact. Id. at 156-57. Knowlton did not involve competitively bid public contracts, a public entity or 
violation of public procurement statutes and is not at all analogous or applicable to the instant case. 
DOA and Qwest identify no cases involving competitively bid contracts in support of the argument that the 
Original SBPOs should be reinstated. The only case cited by DOA and Qwest that involved a contract with a public 
entity is Ferkin v. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 25, Town of Hempstead, Nassau Cnty., 15 N.E.2d 799 
(N.Y. 1938). Ferkin, however, did not involve competitively bid contracts. 15 N.E.2d at 799-800. Additionally, 
Ferkin involved multiple separate contracts, not contracts that were subsequently amended. Id. ("There is nothing in 
the supplemental agreement which evidences and intent that the agreement should be substituted for or operate to 
nullify the original agreements."). Ferkin is thus inapposite. 
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that illegal amendments can render both the amendment and underlying contract void. The 
description of Syringa's injury and the analysis of redressability and standing in Syringa I 
demonstrate that this Court may have contemplated the same remedy. 
The Alaska Supreme Court explained its analysis of the impact of material amendments 
on the competitive bidding process as follows: 
[G]enerally a government contract that was initially competitively 
bid cannot be materially amended because that is tantamount to 
forming a new contract, which should be accomplished by starting 
all over again with competitive bidding. This rule has been 
judicially imposed in order to guard against circumvention of 
competitive bidding requirements. Competitive bidding itself is 
designed to ensure that government obtains the most favorable 
terms possible in its contracts, and to protect the public from the 
possibility of favoritism, fraud, and corruption on the part of public 
officials. 
Kenai Lumber Co., Inc. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215,220 (Alaska 1982) (citation omitted) (finding 
amendment immaterial); accord Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 433 (Alaska 1998). Maryland's 
highest court explained the concept in a similar way: 
The generally accepted rule is that where a statute requires that a 
contract for public work shall be let to the lowest responsible 
bidder, a municipal corporation or administrative agency cannot 
evade the law by making substantial changes in the contract after it 
has been awarded pursuant to the law. In short, the municipality or 
agency cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing 
directly. 
Hanna v. Bd. of Ed. of Wicomico Cnty., 87 A.2d 846, 849 (Md. 1952) ( emphasis added). 13 
Although the determination whether a public contract amendment is "material" can be 
13 For a similar statement of the emphasized law, see Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 505 ("A government agency 
may not do indirectly what it is prevented by law from doing directly."). 
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fact dependent, the most important fact is the impact of the amendment on the competitive 
bidding process: 
Not all amendments to competitively bid contracts are prohibited, 
only those regarded as material. The concept of materiality in this 
context has not been satisfactoriiy captured in a single phrase. One 
court has spoken of 'an essential change of such magnitude as to 
be incompatible with the general scheme' of competitive bidding; 
another has phrased the question to be whether the amendment 'so 
varied from the original plan, was of such importance, or so altered 
the essential identity or main purpose of the contract, that it 
constitutes a new undertaking.' These formulations simply 
recognize that the materiality concept prohibits those changes 
which tend to be subversive of the purposes of competitive 
bidding. 
Ki/a, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Admin., 876 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Alaska 1994). The most important 
consideration in other words, concerns whether an amendment to a competitively bid public 
contract undermines or undoes the statutory competitive bidding scheme. See, e.g., Hanna, 87 
A.2d at 849 (where board of education provisionally awarded school construction contract and 
subsequently changed the scope of work to be performed by the winning bidder and awarded the 
contract without re-advertising for new bids, the contract violated competitive bidding rules and 
thus construction under the contract was enjoined); Hanisco v. Twp. of Warminster, 41 A.3d 116, 
123-26 (Pa. Cornrnw. Ct. 2012) (where an amendment changed the price terms of a public 
contract between a township and a waste-services contractor by establishing a rebate, a new 
bidding process was required) ("Where, as here, there is deviation from the requirements of 
public bidding, the proper procedure is to ... readvertise, and secure another open competitive 
bidding so that all of the bidders would be on an equal footing."). 
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Like the above cases, Amendments No. 1 made material changes to the scope of work to 
be performed under SBPOs 1308 and 1309 and undermined the purpose of Idaho's competitive 
bidding statutes. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. This Court ruled Syringa has standing only when 
Amendments No. 1 are viewed in the context of the "entire bidding process." Id. at 505. Viewed 
in that fashion, this Court concluded that "by amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA 
were no longer furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect changed the RFP 
after the bids had been opened in violation of I.C. § 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052." Id. 
Amendments No. 1, in other words, so undermined the competitive bid process that it, and the 
contracts that resulted could not be repaired. 
Syringa's injury, according to this Court, was the inability to submit a separate bid to 
perform the technical network services (backbone) work that was assigned exclusively to Qwest 
by Amendments No. 1. This injury cannot be redressed "in isolation" by declaring Amendments 
No. 1 to be void and restoring the original IEN SBPOs. Id. Redress, in this case, is represented 
by the District Court holding the IEN Contracts, as Amended, void. 
(ii) Law of the Case Did Not Estop Syringa From Challenging the 
IEN Contracts, as Amended. 
Syringa argued in the first appeal that the original SBPOs were lawful but that their 
amendment violated the law. (See Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Brief, filed February 27, 2012 at 
24-27, 32-34, 51; Syringa Networks' Reply Brief, filed June 4, 2012 at 2-4).) This Court agreed: 
By amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer 
furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect, 
changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation ofI.C. 
§ 67-5718(2) and IDAP A 38.05.01.052. The separate contracts as 
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amended no longer conform to the RFP' s description of the 
property to be acquired. The description of property to be provided 
by Qwest under its amended contract is not a minor deviation from 
the property to be provided by the successful bidder under the 
RFP, nor is the property to be provided by ENA under its amended 
contract. 
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). This Court remanded for consistent proceedings. 
Id. at 512. 
The District Court ruled, post-appeal, that Syringa was estopped from directly 
challenging the issuance of the Original SBPOs as pretext to splitting the IEN work between 
Qwest and ENA. (R. pp. 1399-1402 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) The District 
Court's decision, however, did not prevent the District Court from following the law of the case 
established by this Court and allowing Syringa to amend its complaint to allege that the IEN 
Contracts, as Amended, are void. (R. pp. 1397-1399 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) 
(iii) Syringa Was Not Estopped From Challenging Amended 
SBPO 1309 to ENA. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party :from advantageously taking one position, then 
subsequently asserting a second position that is incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v. 
Wood, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (Idaho 2005). "Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party from assuming 
a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent 
proceeding." Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. Idaho 1998). "The 
doctrine of judicial estoppel sounds in equity and is invoked at the discretion of the court." 
Sword v. Sweet, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (Idaho 2004). 
The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect "the integrity of the judicial system, by 
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protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial 
proceeding." A & J Const. Co., 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 952 
P.2d at 916). Broadly accepted, it is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with 
the legal system, Id,; see also 31 CJ,S, Estoppel and Waiver§ 186 (2012). Judicial estoppel 
protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants; therefore, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate individual prejudice. A & J Const. Co., 116 P .3d at 16 ( citation omitted). "Judicial 
estoppel must be applied with caution and in the narrowest of circumstances so as to avoid 
impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a 
contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel 
and Waiver§ 68. 
Syringa consistently challenged the legality of the Amended SBPOs since early in the 
case. The original complaint was filed December 15, 2009. (Augmented R. pp. 17-21.) On 
February 23, 2010, Syringa filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause that concerned the Amended 
SBPO to Qwest and the Amended SBPO to ENA and asked the Court to issue an Order directed 
to DOA to show cause: 
Why the DOA should not be enjoined from acqumng further 
services or property for the IEN Project pursuant to Statewide 
Blanket Purchase Orders 1308-01 and 1309-01 or from otherwise 
directing Education Networks of America, Inc. to select Qwest 
Communications Company, LLC as the exclusive 
telecommunications supplier for the IEN Project. 
(Augmented R. p. 564; see Augmented R. pp. 666-688.) 
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Syringa again contended, in support of a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision 
dismissing Count Three of its complaint, that both the February 26, 2009 Amended SBPOs 
violated state procurement law: 
The fundamental question presented by this Motion for 
Reconsideration concerns whether there is an administrative 
remedy associated with the amendment of contracts for the 
purchase of goods or services by the State that, if not pursued, 
defeats the right of an injured party with standing to pursue a 
declaratory judgment to determine the legality of the contract 
amendments under Idaho Code§§ 67-5718A and/or 67-5726. The 
contract amendments, in this case, are Amended SBPOs 1308-02 
[sic] and 1309-02 [sic] that removed the internet backbone and 
connectivity portions of the IEN project from ENA and its 
subcontractor, Syringa, and assigned the work exclusively to 
Qwest. 
(Augmented R. p. 1226.) 
Syringa persisted in its contention that the IEN Contracts, as Amended to Qwest and 
ENA violated state procurement law both pre-appeal and on appeal. (See, e.g., Augmented Conf. 
R. p. 44; Augmented R. pp. 2226-2227; Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Brief, filed in this Court 
February 27, 2012 at 24-27, 32-34, 48-51; Syringa Networks' Reply Brief, filed in this Court 
June 4, 2012 at 2-9.) Syringa's Motion to Amend Count Three of the Complaint to assert the 
illegality of the Amended SBPO to ENA following remittitur was, in fact, entirely consistent 
with its earlier positions and challenges to both SBPOs, as amended. 
Further, judicial estoppel does not apply against a party who "never obtained a judgment, 
advantage or consideration" from the asserting party. Smith v. US.R. V. Properties, LLC, 118 
P.3d 127, 132 (Idaho 2005) (citing Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 719 P.2d 1169, 1175 
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(Idaho 1986)). Syringa obtained no advantage from any sort of alleged change in position. 
Additionally, as demonstrated above, Syringa consistently challenged the IEN procurement 
process that resulted in the Amended SBPOs. 
be foreclosed on grounds of judicial estoppel. 
c. Amendments No. 1 Affected the Entire Scope of Services Described in 
the IEN RFP and the Original SBPOs-Including Services to State 
Agencies. 
Broadband connections to state agencies were included within the scope of the IEN RFP, 
the IEN contracts and the IEN contracts, as amended. As described supra in the Statement of 
Facts, the state agencies were specifically added to the IEN RFP by Amendment 03 on 
December 29, 2008 and were not excluded from Amendments No. 1 to the IEN SBPOs. 
Additionally, Section 3.2 of the IEN RFP included schools and state agencies within the scope of 
what it described as the Idaho Education Network and clearly stated that the intended IEN award 
would involve the provision of service to E-rate eligible entities as well as the provision of 
service to non-E-rate eligible entities, including state agencies. SBPOs 1308 and 1309 also state 
that the contracts are for the benefit and Idaho schools, agencies, and other institutions. 
The District Court properly held that its ruling applied to all work under the Amended 
SBPOs. (R. pp. 2030-2031 (Reconsideration Decision).) Qwest's argument that state agency 
services were not subject to the IEN Contracts, as Amended, is contradicted by the record. 
3. Courts Have an Independent Duty to Invalidate Illegal Contracts. 
This Court recognized in Syringa I that contracts issued in violation of state procurement 
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law "are void." 305 P.3d at 514 ("All contracts made in violation of these statues are void and 
any money advanced by the State in consideration of such contracts must be repaid."). 
Consistent with this conclusion, on remand, the District Court determined that the IEN Contracts, 
as Amended, were issued in violation of state law and were, therefore, illegai and void. (R. pp. 
1646-1651 (Dispositive Decision).) 
Even if the multitude of procedural and technical arguments raised by Appellants 
concerning S yringa' s ability to challenge the IEN Contracts, as Amended, had merit, the District 
Court's decision to declare the contracts void, is, without doubt, the right decision. 
Idaho courts have an independent duty to raise the issue of contract illegality and to void 
contracts that are illegal. Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833, 842 (Idaho 1952) (raising, sua 
sponte, and voiding illegal contract); Quiring v. Quiring, 944 P.2d 695, 701-02 (Idaho 1997) 
(raising and voiding illegal contract when issue was not argued or addressed below); Hyta v. 
Finley, 53 P.3d 338, 340-41 (Idaho 2002) (raising and voiding illegal contract when issue was 
not raised by the parties or addressed by the District Court); Pines Grazing Ass 'n, Inc. v. Flying 
Joseph Ranch, LLC, 265 P.3d 1136, 1139-40 (Idaho 2011) (raising, sua sponte, issue of illegal 
contract); Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 841-42 (Idaho 2011) (voiding illegal 
contract, though District Court held that party did not have standing to assert illegality); Hill v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 812, 822 (Idaho 2011) ("the Court must not enforce any 
contract 'at any stage in the litigation' in which it becomes apparent that the provision 
contravenes public policy"); AED, Inc. v. KDC Invests., LLC, 307 P.3d 176, 184 (Idaho 2013) 
(voiding illegal contract). 
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"The duty to avoid enforcing an invalid contract term is so strong that Idaho's courts 
must raise the public policy issue sua sponte if necessary." Hill, 249 P .3d at 822 ( emphasis 
added). When raising the issue of illegality, an Idaho court "does not concern itself as to the 
manner in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention." Taylor, 261 P.3d 
at 841 (quoting Stearns, 240 P.2d at 842). The duty to void illegal contracts exists if the issue is 
not raised on appeal or decided below, Pines Grazing Ass 'n, 265 P.3d at 1139-40; if the issue 
was not pled by any party, Hyta, 53 P .3d at 340-41; and if the District Court held that a party did 
not have standing to assert illegality, Taylor, 26 l P .3d at 841. This duty extends to simple 
statutory violations, such as a contractor failing to register, and to complex ones like violation of 
federal antitrust laws. AED, Inc., 307 P.3d at 184-85 (voiding contract that violated contractor-
registration law); Pines Grazing Ass 'n, 265 P .3d at 1139-41 (voiding contract, sua sponte, that 
violated the federal Sherman Antitrust Act). 
DOA argues that this Court's ruling in City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 299 P.3d 232 
(Idaho 2013), required the District Court only to invalidate Amendments No. 1 and to leave the 
original SBPOs intact. But Petra has no bearing on this case. (DOA Opening Brief at 37-39.) 
The Petra case involved a contract's failure to comply with public works contract 
backlog requirements, which the city alleged rendered the contract illegal and void. The Court, 
however, held that the entire agreement was not void because the parties could legally operate 
under the agreement by obtaining the required performance bond. Petra, 299 P.3d at 253. The 
Petra court also noted that "there is no evidence that this agreement was 'made for the purpose 
of furthering any matter' prohibited by statute, or that it was 'founded' on something illegal. The 
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parties' goal was to construct a building, not to circumvent the State's performance bond 
statute." Petra, 299 P .3d at 253. In stark contrast, this Court held in Syringa I held that DOA' s 
IEN procurement process constituted a "scheme[] to evade law" and an unlawful attempt to do in 
two steps what was prohibited in one. 305 P.3d at 506. Further, here a return to the original 
SBPOs would not have redressed Syringa's injury, the inability to bid for broadband connectivity 
services. This case is more similar to AED, Inc., where this Court distinguished Petra and 
voided a contract based on the clear language of the Idaho Contractor Registration. 307 P.3d at 
184-85. 
The District Court properly recognized its duty under the Quiring line of cases and 
properly declared the IEN Contracts, as Amended, void. 
4. The District Court Did Not Violate ENA's Rights in Granting Summary 
Judgment Against DOA. 
a. Res Judicata Does Not Bar Syringa's Challenge to the Amended ENA 
SBPO Because There Was No Previous Lawsuit and Never a Final 
Judgment on Syringa's Declaratory Judgment Claim. 
Syringa's declaratory judgment action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
because neither the District Court nor this Court entered final judgment on Syringa's declaratory 
judgment claim and because Syringa did not file a brand new lawsuit by amending its complaint 
post-appeal. 
A claim is precluded by res judicata where: "(1) the original action ended in final 
judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as the original action, and 
(3) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original 
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action." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (Idaho 2012) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted); accord Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 157 P.3d 613,618 (Idaho 2007). 
The first element of the test is not met in this case because there was no "original action" 
that ended in a final judgment on the merits. See Berkshire lrzvests., LLC, 278 P.3d at 951 ("As 
an initial matter, issue and claim preclusion both require that the separate proceedings involve 
the same parties or their privies.") (emphasis added); Hindmarsh v. Mock, 57 P.3d 803, 805 
(Idaho 2002) ("Res judicata prevents the same plaintiff from bringing multiple lawsuits against 
the same defendant for actions arising from the same event.") (emphasis added). 
ENA asserts that the "District Court has ruled that the original action against ENA ended 
in a final judgment on the merits." (ENA Opening Brief at 21.) The District Court made no 
such ruling. The District Court entered judgment before the appeal dismissing Syringa's 
Complaint. Appeal was taken, Syringa I was released on March 29, 2013, which remanded for 
"further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." 305 P.3d at 512. After Remittitur 
and the filing of Syringa's Motion to Rename Count Three and to Amend Paragraph 94 of its 
Complaint, the District Court ruled, contrary to the position argued by Syringa, that ENA was 
not a party post-appeal and "must be made a party to this action." (R. p. 1403 (Amendment 
Reconsideration Decision).) 
ENA suggests (without citing any legal authority) that Syringa commenced a new lawsuit 
by amending Count Three of its Complaint.14 ENA's suggestion is inconsistent with the facts 
14 ENA refers to "the original Complaint" and the "original action" when discussing Syringa's pre-appeal 
complaint. (ENA Opening Brief at 22-24.) 
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and not supported by the law because the amendment of a complaint does not commence a new 
lawsuit. Rather, "an amended complaint supersedes prior complaints such that all subsequent 
pleadings must be based upon the contents of the amended complaint." Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
Cnty. of Kootenai, 258 P.3d 340, 346 (Idaho 2011). ENA has not, in other words, been sued in 
two separate actions by Syringa and this action is, for purposes of res judicata, still the "original 
action." 
ENA cited no Idaho cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been applied in the 
context of a single lawsuit. Every Idaho case cited by ENA involved two distinct actions and are 
inapplicable to this case. See Walters v. Indus. Indem. Co. of Idaho, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (Idaho 
1997) (Plaintiffs filed a new declaratory relief action after having their first action dismissed on 
appeal, and the second action was barred by resjudicata); Hindmarsh, 57 P.3d at 807 (Plaintiff 
first sued Defendant in small claims court and received a judgment, and Plaintiffs second suit 
against Defendant in District Court was properly barred by res judicata); Ticor Title Co., 157 
P.3d at 617 (title company, who was party to bankruptcy action in which final judgment was 
entered, was precluded from bringing later action against the petitioner in the bankruptcy action 
concerning property at issue in the bankruptcy); Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Shirey, 878 P.2d 762, 
768-70 (Idaho 1994) (Plaintiffs' action barred by res judicata where Plaintiffs' claims arose out 
of same transaction as claims in earlier bankruptcy action to which Plaintiffs were privies); 
Berkshire Invests., LLC, 278 P.3d at 951 (subsequent action barred by res Judicata where prior 
case ended with final judgment that was affirmed on appeal); Silver Eagle Mining Co. v. State, 
280 P.3d 679, 685 (Idaho 2012) (applying and interpreting federal claim preclusion law and 
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finding subsequent state court action barred by earlier federal agency determination). 
ENA urges this Court to apply res judicata on a piecemeal basis by arguing that this 
Court's decision in Syringa I affirming the dismissal of Syringa's breach of contract claim 
(Count Six of Syringa' s Complaint) was final for purposes of res judicata. (ENA Opening Brief 
at 22-23.) The authorities cited in support of this proposition, however, involved distinguishable 
situations where a party tried to relitigate a claim whose dismissal was affirmed on appeal. See 
Merrimack St. Garage, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 667 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.N.H. 1987); Ernest W 
Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, No. C-75-2706 RPA, 1981 WL 2191, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1981); 
Mazaleski v. Harris, 481 F. Supp. 696,698 (D.D.C. 1979). Even if this Court were to follow the 
analysis of the cases selected by ENA, they do not require the application of res judicata as to 
Count Three. The dismissal of Count Three was reversed, not affirmed, on appeal. There was 
never a final judgment on the declaratory judgment action and that claim was remanded to the 
District Court for consistent proceedings. 
Finally, a review of the purposes underlying the res judicata doctrine demonstrates why 
res judicata is inapplicable under these procedural circumstances: 
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution 
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it 
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the 
burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private 
interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
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Hindmarsh, 57 P.3d at 805 (citation omitted). In this case the same matter is not being "twice 
litigated," and there is no "repetitious litigation" or "harassment" because this is the "original 
action" commenced in 2009. 
Syringa did not file a new lawsuit post-appeal against ENA, as ENA contends. Instead, 
Syringa instituted a lawsuit that was decided, appealed, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Following remand, the District Court, in its discretion, and consistent with Syringa I, permitted 
Syringa to amend its declaratory judgment claim to challenge DOA's issuance of the Amended 
SBPO to ENA. There was no final judgment on the declaratory judgment action against DOA. 
Res judicata does not apply under these circumstances. 
b. The District Court Did Not Err in Treating ENA's Motion to Dismiss 
as One for Summary Judgment. 
After the District Court ruled on the contents of the post-appeal complaint, Syringa filed 
its Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, and served it, along 
with a Summons, on ENA on July 3, 2014. (See Ex. 4 to McQuade Affidavit.) ENA 
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss in which it claimed Syringa was barred by the doctrines 
of judicial estoppel and res judicata from asserting Count Three as applied to ENA. (R. pp. 
1434-1447.) 
The District Court explained that it treated ENA's Motion to Dismiss as an I.R.C.P. 
I2(b)(6) motion because the motion was based on the doctrines of res judicata and judicial 
estoppel, which are normally pleaded as affirmative defenses. (R. pp. 1644-1645 (Dispositive 
Decision).) The District Court further explained that "[b ]ecause the motion involves 
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consideration of matters outside the pleadings, the Court will treat the 12(b )( 6) as a motion for 
summary judgment as to those affirmative defenses under I.R.C.P. 56." (R. p. 1645 (Dispositive 
Decision).) ENA takes issue with this decision. 
The Court's decision to convert ENA's motion was not improper. Under I.R.C.P. 12(b): 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered ( 6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
I.R.C.P. 12(b); see McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824, 829 (Idaho 2012) ("Where a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is supported by information 
outside of the pleadings, the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment."). 
ENA presented matters outside the pleading (Syringa's Second Amended Post-Appeal 
Complaint) in its Motion to Dismiss. ENA asserts it "presented a motion to dismiss free of any 
disputed facts," but that assertion misconstrues the standard, which focuses on matters outside 
the "pleading" being challenged. (ENA Opening Brief at 30.) ENA cited the following 
documents outside the challenged pleading in support of its Motion to Dismiss (the page 
citations are examples; certain documents are cited multiple times throughout the brief): (1) 
Syringa's original Complaint (R. p. 1438); (2) the District Court's Reconsideration Decision (R. 
p. 1438); (3) This Court's Opinion (R. pp. 1438-1439, 1445); (4) Syringa's Second Amended 
Post Appeal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (R. pp. 1440-1441); and (5) Feb. 9, 2011 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment (R. p. 1444). 
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ENA also did not constrain its challenge to the facts alleged in Syringa's Second 
Amended Post Appeal Complaint, but relied upon decisions from the District Court and this 
Court involving facts outside the four comers of the challenged pleading (such as affidavits and 
deposition testimony, submitted for the courts' consideration by various parties). (R. pp. 1437-
1447.) Because those decisions were based upon evidence outside the challenged pleading, they 
also constituted "matters outside the pleading" under I.R.C.P. 12(b). 
ENA's submission and reference to these materials that were outside the challenged 
pleadings made the conversion of ENA's Motion to Dismiss appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
c. The District Court Did Not Ignore ENA's Motion to Dismiss 
Arguments And Properly Ruled that ENA's Arguments to Avoid 
Joinder Could Not Prevent a Ruling on the Merits of Count Three. 
The District Court did not avoid its duty to address ENA's arguments concerning its 
status as a party and properly ruled that ENA's arguments could not overcome the affirmative 
duty of the District Court to invalidate illegal contracts and the obvious illegality of the JEN 
Contracts, as Amended. (R. pp. 1648-1649 (Dispositive Decision).) The District Court decision 
was especially appropriate because Count Three sought declaratory relief that public contracts 
issued by DOA violated competitive bidding statutes designed to protect the taxpayer. 
None of the cases cited by ENA support the proposition that a party to a public contract 
issued in violation of competitive bidding statutes can prevail on procedural defenses that 
insulate the unlawful contracts from judicial scrutiny. 
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In Chandler v. Hayden, cited by ENA, this Court reversed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment where the trial court did not consider the admissibility of evidence offered in 
support of affirmative defenses to the enforcement of a contract between private parties. 
had affirmative defenses related to the formation and enforceability of the contract at issue, 
including fraud in the inducement and mutual mistake. Id. This Court ruled that "the District 
Court erred by enforcing a contract without first considering whether a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to Chandler's affirmative defenses, which if proven, could invalidate the 
Agreement." 215 P.3d at 491. Unlike the non-moving party in Chandler, ENA did not raise any 
defenses that addressed the merits of Count Three that could have precluded summary judgment 
against DOA. 
Similarly, Idaho Power Co. v. State, By and Through Department of Water Resources is 
inapplicable. In Idaho Power Company, this Court did not reverse the trial court's decision for 
failure to consider affirmative defenses before ruling on the merits; rather, this Court reversed a 
ruling related to the affirmative defenses and so ruled that on remand the affirmative defenses 
should be considered. 661 P .2d 7 41, 7 54 (Idaho 1983) ("Since we have reversed that ruling of 
the District Court, the cause must be remanded for consideration of, and findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the issues raised by those affirmative defenses alleging the loss of Idaho 
Power's water rights at Swan Falls."). These cases might have been applicable if DOA or ENA 
had raised an affirmative defense to DOA's IEN procurement process that was ignored by the 
District Court, but they are not applicable under the procedural history of this case. 
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Additionally, ENA's assertion that the District Court ignored its arguments is misplaced. 
In Sirius LC v. Erickson, this Court ruled that the trial court improperly granted summary 
judgment on issues not properly before the trial court. 156 P.3d 539, 544 (Idaho 2007). ENA 
argues that the reasoning of Sirius LC precludes a trial court from disregarding matters properly 
before it. (ENA Opening Brief at 31-32.) In the instant case, the District Court ruled on the 
issues presented by Syringa's summary judgment motion. The District Court did not disregard 
ENA's arguments but instead determined that ENA's arguments could not insulate DOA's IEN 
procurement process from judicial review. That decision was correct because courts have a clear 
duty, not a "perceived duty" as ENA suggests, to "raise the issue of illegality, whether pled or 
otherwise, at any stage in the litigation." Hyta, 53 P.3d at 341 (quoting Quiring, 944 P.2d at 701-
02). 
Finally, even if the District Court should have addressed EN A's judicial estoppel and res 
judicata arguments before the cross motions for summary judgment, the lack of merit to those 
arguments renders any such error harmless. 
d. ENA Had Notice and Opportunity to Respond to Syringa's Summary 
Judgment Motion and Remained Silent. 
ENA argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against ENA 
because ENA did not have an opportunity to respond to Syringa's motion, support its converted 
motion, or develop a record to show judgment against ENA was improper. (ENA Opening Brief 
at 36-52.) The District Court, however, did not enter summary judgment against ENA. The 
District Court entered summary judgment against DOA. (R. pp. 2016-2038 (Reconsideration 
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Decision and Judgment).) As explained supra with respect to UDJA requirements, ENA was 
required to be a party to this action but was not required to be named as a defendant in Count 
Three. ENA's argument, therefore, relies on the incorrect premise that the District Court entered 
judgment against ENA. 
ENA had the opportunity to respond to Syringa's summary judgment motion as a party 
whose interests could be affected by the relief sought in Count Three. ENA had appropriate 
notice of Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and nothing prevented ENA from 
filing an opposition brief or from joining in DOA's opposition, as it did by presenting oral 
argument at the hearing on the dispositive motions. (Tr. p. 66, 1. 21 p. 69, I. 6.) 
Syringa filed a Notice of Service of Pleadings on ENA and Qwest, verifying that Syringa 
served its post-appeal pleadings, including its March 20, 2014 Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, on ENA and Qwest on April 25, 2014. (See Ex. 1 to McQuade Affidavit.) After the 
District Court reconsidered its decision on the contents of the post-appeal complaint, Syringa 
filed its Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on June 25, 2014, 
and served it, along with a Summons, on ENA on July 3, 2014. (Ex. 4 to McQuade Affidavit.) 
ENA subsequently filed its Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2014 (R. pp. 1434-1436.) 
Syringa filed a Fourth Amended Notice of Hearing on August 22, 2014, re-noticing its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for hearing on October 10, 2014, the date set by the 
District Court for a hearing on multiple motions. Syringa's notice was served on all defendants, 
including ENA. (See Ex. 5 to McQuade Affidavit.) 
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ENA argues that it did not have proper notice of Syringa's motion under I.R.C.P. 56. 
(ENA Opening Brief at 37-41.) To the contrary, the record shows that ENA was served with 
Syringa's motion, at the latest, by April 25, 2014, almost six months before the October 10, 2014 
hearing date. And, ENA was served \.Vith the Second An1endcd Post Appeal Complaint about 
three months before the hearing date, and received notice that Syringa's motion was re-noticed 
for October 10, 2014 about two months before the hearing date. Neither Rule 56 nor the cases 
cited by ENA required Syringa to re-serve the summary judgment motion on ENA after serving 
the Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint on ENA. 
ENA argues that I.R.C.P. 12(b) provided ENA with additional notice protections. Rule 
12(b) provides that if the trial court converts a motion, "all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." LR.C.P. 12(b ). 
The record contains no indication by ENA concerning what additional materials, if any, ENA 
would have submitted in support of the judicial estoppel and res judicata arguments contained in 
its Motion to Dismiss. With respect to Syringa's summary judgment motion, ENA was given a 
"reasonable opportunity" to present all the arguments it believed it had concerning the legality of 
the SBPOs, as Amended, but apparently chose not to file an opposition in the hope it would 
prevail on its Motion to Dismiss. 
ENA had notice that the District Court decided to hear ENA's motion on the same date as 
Syringa's summary judgment motion but made a strategic decision not to file an opposition brief. 
Further, although ENA did not file a brief in opposition to Syringa' s motion, counsel for ENA 
presented argument in opposition to Syringa's summa.ry judgment motion at the October 10, 
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2014 hearing. (Tr. p. 66, L 21 p. 69, 1. 6.) Additionally, ENA could have presented arguments 
concerning the legality of the Amended SBPOs in its Motion for Reconsideration, but instead 
only previewed the arguments. (R. pp. 1736-1737.) 
ENA had notice of Syringa's summary judgment motion months before it was heard and 
was never denied the opportunity to be heard. ENA chose not to be heard through briefing, but 
presented oral argument. ENA was not denied any protections afforded by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure or the Due Process Clause. See Meyers v. Hansen, 221 P .3d 81, 89 (Idaho 2009) 
(procedural due process requires that parties "must be provided with notice and an opportunity to 
be heard" (citing Spencer v. Kootenai County, 180 P.3d 487,493 (Idaho 2008))). 
The District Court properly entered summary judgment against DOA after giving ENA, a 
party interested in the outcome of Count Three, the opportunity to oppose Syringa's summary 
judgment motion. 
5. Syring a Did Not Waive its Right to Challenge the Legality of the Amended 
SBPOs by Entering into a Contract with Qwest for a Small Portion of IEN 
Connectivity Work. 
As explained in the Statement of Facts supra, two years after DOA amended the SBPOs 
in violation ofldaho Code§§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2), Syringa entered into a limited Service 
Agreement to provide connectivity to Qwest for portions of the IEN that were located in areas 
not well served by Qwest. 
DOA and Qwest assert that Syringa's agreement to provide "on call" connectivity to 
Qwest constitutes a waiver of Syringa's right and standing to enforce Idaho purchasing law by 
declaratory judgment. This waiver contention misses the point of Cou..rit Three. The point of 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 71 
3438924_8 [5821-112] 
Count Three and Syringa I is that competition was unlawfully removed from the IEN contracting 
process by Amendments No. 1 that made material changes to the scope of work described in the 
IEN RFP. The harm to Syringa was the loss of its ability to fairly compete for the scope of work 
that was given to Qwest by Amendments No. 1. That harm is neither redressed nor resolved by 
the Service Agreement. Further, the Syringa contract with Qwest is not a contract with DOA and 
is not a benefit received by Syringa from DOA's unlawful manipulation of the IEN procurement 
process. 
DOA and Qwest cite inapplicable cases involving waiver that have no bearing on this 
case. See Thomas MD v. Medical Center Physicians, PA, 61 P.3d 557, 563 (Idaho 2002) 
(plaintiff-doctor waived his right to contest his termination when he entered into post-termination 
agreements and accepted additional compensation as consideration from the employer); Johnson 
v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 23 (Idaho 1985) (husband and wife plaintiffs in a personal injury action 
barred from suit after the plaintiff husband had elected to collect Worker's Compensation 
benefits under the Saskatchewan worker's compensation law); Fremont Cty. v. Warner, 63 P. 
106, 107 (1900) (party who benefitted from contract could not later assert that contract was ultra 
vires); Payette Lakes Protective Ass 'n v. Lake Reservoir Co., 189 P.2d 1009, 1016 (1948) (party 
estopped from challenging contract after receiving benefits of contract); Moore v. Boise Land & 
Orchard Co., 173 P. 117, 117 (1918) (party to contract was estopped from asserting 
encumbrances void). 
In contrast to the foregoing cases, this case involves the violation of express statutes that 
are designed to protect the integrity of the public contracting process and the fiscal health of the 
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State of Idaho. The existence of Syringa's limited contract to provide service to Qwest for the 
IEN does not change the fact that Syringa and other qualified vendors were unlawfully 
foreclosed by the DOA from bidding independently on the connectivity portion of the IEN 
project that was directed to Qwest by Amendments No. 1. 
6. The Severability Clause Did Not Supplant Idaho's Procurement Statutes. 
Appellants assert that the District Court should have given effect to the severability 
clause incorporated into SBPOs 1308 and 1309 and reinstated the original SBPOs. Appellants' 
argument relies on common law principles concerning contracts between private parties and 
ignores the fundamental distinction that this case involves competitively-bid public contracts. 
When the initial IEN legislation was passed in 2008, DOA was given administrative 
oversight of the IEN and was specifically directed to "procure telecommunications services and 
equipment for the IEN through an open and competitive bidding process." Ch. 260, § 3, 2008 
Idaho Sess. Laws 753, 754 (previously codified at LC. § 67-5745D(5)(h)). 
This Court explained the significance of Idaho's competitive bidding statutes and 
demonstrated their primacy in the public contracting context in J & J Contractors/0. T Davis 
Construction, A.J. V v. State. In that case, this Court concluded that a contractor could not 
recover in quantum meruit for work performed for a state entity under a contract that was void 
because it violated competitive bidding statutes stating, "[t]he principle is well established in this 
state that when a governmental contract is void, the contractor may not recover in quantum 
meruit." 797 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Idaho 1990). In the course of its decision, the court also 
explained the public policy behind the competitive bidding statutes in the following words: 
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It was manifestly the purpose of the legislature, in enacting the 
[statutes], to procure competitive bidding for contracts for making 
public improvements ... and thereby to safeguard public funds and 
prevent favoritism, fraud and extravagance in their expenditure, .... 
Id. (quoting Seys/er v. Mowery, 160 P. 262,263 (Idaho 1916)). It then concluded that the public 
contracting statutes controlled and that common law principles of quantum meruit did not apply: 
This evidences that there is a strong public policy against the 
enforcement of governmental contracts that violate competitive 
bidding laws. To allow recovery in quantum meruit for work 
performed pursuant to governmental contracts that violate 
competitive bidding statutes would emasculate this public policy. 
Id. The J & J Contractors court denied equitable relief that might have been available had the 
contracts at issue not been public contracts. Id. J & J Contractors demonstrates that Idaho's 
competitive bidding statutory scheme controls over common law contract rules and remedies that 
apply in transactions between private parties because of the significant public policy concerns 
addressed by public contracting statutes. 
A similar principle was recognized by this Court in Syringa I when it noted that RFP 
language to the effect that "the State reserves the right to reject any or all proposals, wholly or 
in part, or to award to multiple bidders in whole or in part" would not negate the requirements 
of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. 15 Put simply, common law principles cannot and do not change or 
undo the public policy expressed in the Idaho's public purchasing statutes. 
The severability clause contained in the State of Idaho Standard Contract Terms and 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 74 
3438924_8 [5821-112] 
Conditions cannot restore the original IEN contracts. There is no way to reconcile Appellants' 
argument with the decision in J & J Contractors described above or with the footnote 1 
declaration by this Court that language in the IEN RFP could not negate the operation of Idaho 
Code§ 67-57i8A. Appellants' argument is not only reflective of bad policy; it contradicts this 
Court's decision in this case and is wrong as a matter of law. Boilerplate language cannot 
supplant the statutes of the State of Idaho, and DOA cannot write provisions into its contracts to 
escape the operation of those mandatory statutes. 
Idaho Code § 67-5725 mandates that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, which violate 
Idaho Code § 67-5718A and Idaho Code § 67-5718(2), are void. The competitive bidding 
statutes DOA was required to follow govern the procurement process and provide a mandate for 
instances where the procurement process is conducted illegally. See Idaho Code, Title 67, 
Chapter 57 ( entitled "Department of Administration"). DOA is bound by these statutes, 
including Idaho Code§ 67-5725. 
D. The District Court Acted Within its Discretion in Awarding Attorney Fees to 
Syringa as the Prevailing Party. 
1. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Deciding that Syringa was 
the Prevailing Party. 
"Determination of the prevailing parties m a civil action is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court." Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 606 (Idaho 2012) (citations 
15 Syringa I, 305 P .3d at 505 n. l ("The RFP stated: 'All purchases, leases, or contracts which are based on 
competitive proposals will be awarded according to the provisions in the Request for Proposal. The State reserves 
the right to reject any or all proposals, wholly or in part, or to award to multiple bidders in whole or in part.' 
(Emphasis added.) This provision would not negate the requirement of Idaho Code section 67-5718A(i) that 
awarding a contract to multiple bidders must be to furnish the same or similar property."). 
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omitted). A district court does not abuse its discretion so long as it (1) perceived the issue as one 
of discretion, (2) acted within the outer bounds of its discretion, in accord with applicable legal 
principles, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Id. (citation omitted). 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Syringa was the prevailing 
party in this litigation. The District Court perceived the issue as one of discretion in its April 20, 
2015 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion For an Award of Costs and 
Attorney Fees ("Fee Decision"). (R. pp. 2356.) It correctly applied the relevant legal principles 
that it should take an "overall view" of the case, not a claim-by-claim analysis, and compare the 
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. (R. 
p. 2356 (citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & 
Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 133 (Idaho 2005)).) And, it reached its ultimate conclusion through 
an exercise of reason, specifically recognizing that: 
[F]rom the overall view, while Syringa lost a number of 
preliminary battles, in the end, Syringa won the war that mattered 
decisively, after a lengthy and expensive challenge to a state 
agency willing and able to devote significant resources defending 
its conduct. Syringa's challenge effectively terminated a 
significant and long term State initiative to design and implement 
internet connectivity to all schools in Idaho. 
(R. p. 2357.) By properly applying the law and by disclosing its reasoning for its decision, the 
District Court determined Syringa was the prevailing party by an exercise of reason. See Palmer 
v. Spain, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Idaho 2003); Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 88, 
95 (Idaho 2001) (the District Court must disclose its reasoning in order for the appellate court to 
determine whether this element satisfied). 
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The Fee Decision was not only well within the District Court's discretion; it was correct. 
Syringa sought two alternate forms of relief: money damages in the event the IEN contracts 
remained in effect for the twenty-year period contemplated in the RFP (Augmented R. p. 34), or 
a declaratory judgment that the IEN contracts violated the law and were void and permanently 
enjoining performance thereunder. (R. p. 1423.) Syringa sought judgment declaring the IEN 
Contracts, as Amended, void to break Qwest's publicly-funded monopoly control of school and 
state agency broadband services, and to permit Syringa to participate in a lawful, competitive bid 
process to provide broadband services to Idaho schools and agencies. Through the lawsuit, 
Syringa successfully dismantled Qwest's monopoly, has begun competing for broadband 
contracts, and is in a position to compete when another bidding process is begun. 
DOA contends that Syringa is not the prevailing party and relies heavily on the 2012 case 
of Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Construction, LLC, 294 P.3d 171 (Idaho 2012). (DOA 
Opening Brief at 43-45.) The Hobson court upheld the District Court's determination that both 
parties prevailed in part where the parties narrowed the claims of the other party and ultimately 
settled the case without a determination of liability. 294 P.3d at 177. In reaching that decision, 
this Court stated that a court making a prevailing party determination must not just consider 
"who succeeded on more individual claims" but must consider "among other things, the extent to 
which each party prevailed relative to the 'final judgment or result."' 294 P.3d at 175 (citing 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)). 
Despite Robson's admonition that the prevailing party determination is not reduced to a 
numbers game wherein each party's winning claims are tallied against the other's winning 
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claims, DOA counts the claims on which Syringa did not prevail. (DOA Opening Brief at 46.) 
More importantly, Hobson is not the final word of this Court on the determination of who is a 
prevailing party. In Advanced Medical Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Center of Idaho, LLC, this 
Court took the "overall view" approach to determining the prevailing party and held that the 
defendant was the prevailing party because it prevailed on the "primary issue" in the litigation, 
even though the defendant failed to prove any damages. 303 P.3d 171, 174 (Idaho 2013) ("The 
determination of prevailing party is not decided merely by counting the answers on the special 
verdict form and holding that whoever received more answers in its favor is the prevailing 
party."). 
Syringa is the prevailing party because it prevailed on the "primary issue" in this case. 
This lawsuit accomplished what Syringa set out to do. As in Idaho Military Historical Society, 
Inc. v. Maslen, where the plaintiff was awarded equitable relief but did not succeed on a variety 
of secondary issues, here Syringa's claim for equitable relief succeeded, though its secondary 
claims did not. 329 P.3d 1072, 1078-79 (Idaho 2014). Moreover, as in Idaho Military Historical 
Society, Syringa should never have been forced to file a lawsuit; DOA should have complied 
with the law from the outset. Id. at 1078 ("No lawsuit for possession should have been 
necessary."). Furthermore, the Idaho Military Historical Society court looked to the conduct that 
"primarily precipitated" the lawsuit in determining the prevailing party. Id. Here, each one of 
Syringa's claims, including those on which Syringa did not prevail, was precipitated by the 
conduct challenged in Count Three, DOA's unlawful split of the IEN Contracts, as Amended. 
All of these factors support the District Court's conclusion that Syringa was the prevailing party 
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in this litigation. 
DOA argues that the District Court "failed to consider the entire case and the relief 
requested," and that it "failed to consider successes in defending against claims." (DOA 
Opening Brief at 46.) This is simply not true. The District Court explicitly acknowledged that 
the DOA and other defendants had succeeded on some claims. (R. p. 2357 (Fee Decision) ("The 
Court recognizes that Syringa did not prevail on [listing claims].").) The District Court, 
however, correctly recognized that Syringa had prevailed on "most significant claim presented in 
this case," the claim to void the IEN Contracts, as Amended. (R. pp. 2356-2357 (Fee Decision).) 
The District Court properly determined that Syringa was the prevailing party. 
2. The District Court did not err in awarding fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120(3). 
"Whether an action is based on a commercial transaction is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review." Idaho Transp. Dep't v. Ascorp, Inc., 357 P.3d 863, 865 (Idaho 
2015). Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) requires an award of fees to a prevailing party when the lawsuit 
involves a commercial transaction between the prevailing and non-prevailing parties. I.C. § 12-
120(3). As this Court has recognized, there need not be a contract between the parties, so long as 
a commercial transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. E.g., In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. 
Project, 199 P .3d 102, 116 (Idaho 2008). A commercial transaction is the "gravamen" of the 
lawsuit if it is a "material or significant part of' the complaint. Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P .3d 907, 
911-12 (Idaho 2015). A commercial transaction is, in tum, a "material or significant part of' a 
complaint if it "(1) is integral to the claim and (2) constitutes the basis of the party's theory of 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 79 
3438924_8 [5821-l 12] 
recovery on that claim." Id. 
A commercial transaction is the gravamen of Syringa's Complaint, and specifically 
Count Three. Indeed, DOA championed this point during the first appeal by specifically arguing 
it was entitled to fees against Syringa under § 12-120(3). (See State Respondents' Brief and 
Cross-Appeal Brief, filed in this Court April 23, 2012 at 49 ("The IDA is entitled to all attorney 
fees expended in defense of this litigation under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).").) This Court agreed 
that DOA was not precluded from seeking fees under§ 12-120(3). Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 511. 
Having first advocated that the case involved a "commercial transaction" between Syringa and 
DOA, the DOA cannot now credibly argue otherwise. 
In any case, the gravamen of Count Three was a series of commercial transactions to 
which DOA was an integral party. The DOA solicited, and eventually awarded, a contract for 
the design and operation of the Idaho Education Network that was worth tens of millions of 
dollars; Syringa agreed to become ENA's principal subcontractor so ENA could submit a 
responsive proposal to DOA; ENA submitted the JEN Alliance proposal, which explicitly relied 
upon Syringa's broadband capabilities; DOA accepted the proposal; and DOA unlawfully split 
this transaction, denying Syringa the business it expected under the teaming agreement and 
preventing Syringa from submitting its own bid for the work that was given to Qwest. These 
commercial transactions are integral to, and constitute the basis of recovery on, Count Three. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that the gravamen of Count Three was a 
commercial transaction between DOA and Syringa. (R. pp. 2364-2367 (Fee Decision).) 
DOA argues that "[n]o commercial transaction was 'integral' to Syringa's claim against 
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the DOA under Count III," citing Scott v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 852 P.2d 1376 (Idaho 
1993). (DOA Opening Brief at 51.) Scott is an outdated case that denied fees under§ 12-120(3) 
because the parties did not have a "contractual relationship." 852 P.2d at 1383 ("The Scotts are 
not involved in any contractuai reiationship with either Buhl or Mayflower; they are not seeking 
relief upon the basis of a contract, but instead on the basis of a competitive bidding statute."). 
This rationale for denying fees is no longer good law in light of In re University Place and this 
Court's current case law, which does not require a contractual relationship. In re Univ. Place, 
P.3d at 116-119; Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 (2007) (holding 
that Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) "does not require that there be a contract" and that "[a]ny previous 
holdings to the contrary are overruled"). Under the current state of the law, the District Court 
correctly concluded that the gravamen of Count Three was a "commercial transaction" within the 
meaning ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that DOA's post-
remand arguments lacked a reasonable basis and awarding fees under Idaho 
Code§§ 12-117 and§ 12-121. 
The District Court concluded that DOA's continued litigation after this Court's remand 
had no reasonable basis in fact or law. (R. pp. 2362-2364 (Fee Decision).) It, therefore, awarded 
attorney fees after March 29, 2013 under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and§ 12-121. (R. pp. 2362-
2364, 2367-2369 (Fee Decision).) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this 
conclusion. 
The District Court also held that DOA's actions violated the law: "Clearly, DOA erred in 
dividing the RFP work into separate contracts for dissimilar services. DOA could not make 
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Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone. lust as clearly, DOA could not make ENA the 
exclusive provider for E-rate services." (R. p. 2030 (Reconsideration Decision).) The unlawful 
nature of DOA's actions became abundantly clear after Syringa I, as the District Court 
recognized. (R. pp. 2029-2030 (Reconsideration Decision).) Regardless, DOA refused to 
acknowledge this Court's clear language regarding the contract's illegality. (R. p. 1650 
(Dispositive Decision) ("To date, DOA refuses to acknowledge that its bid process in this case 
was and remains fatally flawed. Even after the Supreme Court decision, and despite further 
rulings from this Court rejecting DOA's post appeal arguments, DOA continues to fund these 
contracts. DOA even tries to fix what cannot be fixed.").) Perhaps most strikingly, DOA has 
never offered a substantive justification of the legality of the JEN procurement process. Instead, 
DOA expended years and untold quantities of taxpayer dollars arguing that no one, including 
Syringa, this Court, or the District Court, had standing or the jurisdiction to identify and remedy 
the legal violations that occurred. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the 
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, 
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's 
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
LC. § 12-117(1) (emphasis added). 16 As the District Court correctly noted, Idaho Code§ 12-117 
has two purposes: "(l) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to 
16 Idaho Code § 12-117(2) similarly allows attorney fees if a party prevails on a portion of its case and the 
non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFIRESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC · 82 
3438924_8 [5821-112] 
provide a remedy for persons who have borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. 
Latah Cnty., 1 72 P .3d 1081, 1084 (Idaho 2007) overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn v. 
Randel, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (Idaho 2012). The DOA acted without basis in law because Idaho 
Code§ 67-5718A plainly does not allow DOA to issue split awards and because Idaho Code§ 
67-5718(2) plainly prohibits DOA from changing the scope of work after the bids are opened. 
DOA spent many years and countless dollars arguing that no one could address the illegality of 
the IEN contracts, as amended, and even tried to manipulate the process again after Syringa I by 
entering into the Rescission Amendments. 
The District Court's award of fees squarely vindicates both purposes served by Idaho 
Code § 12-117. The award of fees will serve as a deterrent to future unlawful action, and will 
provide some relief to Syringa, which has borne a huge financial burden attempting to correct 
DOA' s actions. 
DOA argues that an award of fees under § 12-117 is precluded because DOA raised an 
issue of first impression relating to administrative exhaustion. 17 (DOA Opening Brief at 47-48.) 
In making this argument, DOA fails to recognize that the District Court awarded fees under§ 12-
117 only for the time period after this Court decided that it acted unlawfully under Syringa I. 
While Syringa disagrees with DOA's contention that the exhaustion issue was one of first 
Certainly, as to Count Three, Syringa is the prevailing party and for the reasons discussed herein, the DOA acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that claim. 
17 The principle that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies when there are no remedies to exhaust is 
not new. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 207 P.3d 963, 970-971 (2009), cited in Syringa L 305 P.3d at 506, the only 
issue of"first impression" concerned whether Idaho Code§ 67-5733 provided a remedy-which it did not. 
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impression, the disagreement is irrelevant because DOA did not raise the issue after remand. 
Moreover, as described above, in continuing to defend Count Three after remand, the DOA 
consistently ignored the clear implications of this Court's ruling. The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that the post-remand defense was without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law under§ 12-117. 
The District Court also awarded fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, which permits fees to 
the prevailing party when a court finds that a case was defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation. LC. § 12-121; I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(l). Under Idaho Code§ 12-121, the trial 
court must view the case as a whole and apportion fees for those elements of the case that were 
defended frivolously. Idaho Military Historical Soc., 329 P.3d at 1080.18 In accordance with 
these legal standards, the District Court recognized that DOA had successfully defended portions 
of the case. (R. p. 2368 (Fee Decision).) However, after this Court's decision in Syringa I, the 
only claim that remained was Count Three. "Given the Supreme Court's determination that 
DOA's awards were unlawful," the District Court correctly concluded that the DOA's defenses 
were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. (R. p. 2368 (Fee Decision).) 
Finally, DOA argues that the District Court failed to distinguish between work done on 
Count Three and work done on other claims. (DOA Opening Brief at 54-55.) Not true. The 
18 DOA supports its position concerning Idaho Code§ 12-121 by citation to Philips v. Blazier-Henry, 302 
P.3d 349, 356 (Idaho 2013) (following rule set forth in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington 
Federal Savings, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (Idaho 2001)). (DOA Opening Brief at 53-54.) The Philips case is inapposite 
because it was abrogated by Idaho Military Historical Society. This Court stated: "This Court does back away from 
and clarify the overly strict application ofldaho Code section 12-121 set forth in Nampa Meridian. Apportionment 
of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
foundation." 329 P.3d at 1080 (emphasis added). Under the current standard, DOA couid not avoid an adverse fee 
award under Idaho Code§ 12-121 by presenting "one legitimate issue" somewhere during the course of the lawsuit. 
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District Court explicitly recognized, based on its review of Syringa's materials in support of its 
fee request, that Syringa segregated and sought only reasonable fees related to Count Three of 
the Complaint. (R. p. 2367 (Fee Decision).) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
doing so. 
As to the award of fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, the District Court 
recognized that the fee award was discretionary, exercised its discretion in accord with legal 
standards, and came to its decision through an exercise of reason. Therefore, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding post-remand fees to Syringa under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 
and 12-121.19 
E. Syringa is Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal. ENA is Not. 
If Syringa prevails in this appeal, Syringa is entitled to costs and attorney fees under 
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 provides for the award of attorney fees, and Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides 
for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. See I.A.R. 40; I.A.R. 41. 
DOA's appeal is meritless. The core of DO A's appeal is that the District Court erred by 
recognizing and giving effect to this Court's decision in Syringa I. DOA's arguments on appeal 
lack reasonable basis in fact and law and are as frivolous as the arguments below. Accordingly, 
19 DOA does not dispute or provide briefing upon the District Court's award of supplemental fees and 
costs. (See DOA Opening Brief at 43-54; see also R. pp. 2432-2438 (June 20, 2015 Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Supplemental Judgment for Costs and Attorneys Fees, and Supplemental Judgment).) DOA has, 
therefore, waived any challenge to this decision. E.g., Sherman Storage, LLC v. Global Signal Acquisitions IL LLC, 
2015 WL 6657666, at *7 (Idaho Nov. 2, 2015). In any case, the District Court properly recognized its discretion to 
award supplemental fees, identified and applied the correct legal standards, and reached its conclusion through an 
exercise of discretion. (See R. pp. 2432-2436.) 
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S yringa is entitled to its costs and fees on appeal under Idaho Code § § 12-117 and 12-121 . In 
addition, Syringa is entitled to its costs and fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), as the 
appeal involves a commercial transaction between Syringa and DOA, as described above. 
ENA requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). (ENA Opening 
Brief at 52-53.) ENA is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal for two reasons. First, as 
discussed above, Appellants' arguments are wrong as a matter of law. Accordingly, none of the 
Appellants, including ENA, is a prevailing party. Second, ENA has been joined to Count Three 
only because it is a necessary or indispensible party to that claim. Syringa does not assert Count 
Three against ENA. Consequently, even if this Court were to rule against Syringa on Count 
Three, ENA would not be a "prevailing party" on that claim within the meaning of the statute. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court holding that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, are void, 
should be affirmed, subject only to the addition of direction to DOA pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 67-5725 that is the subject of Syringa' s cross-appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of December, 2015. 
GIVENS 
David R. Lombardi 
By: ~·~ ----
Melodie A. McQuade 
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